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PLEA BARGAINING IN THE DARK: THE DUTY
TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY BRADY EVIDENCE
DURING PLEA BARGAINING
Michael Nasser Petegorsky*
Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are the result of guilty pleas.
Despite the criminal justice system’s reliance on plea bargaining, the law
regarding the prosecution’s duty to disclose certain evidence during this
stage of the judicial process is unsettled. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Brady v. Maryland requires the prosecution to disclose evidence that
establishes the defendant’s factual innocence during a trial. Some courts
apply this rule during plea bargaining and require the disclosure of
material exculpatory evidence before the entry of a guilty plea. Other
courts have held or suggested that the prosecution may suppress
exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining, forcing the defendant to
negotiate and determine whether to accept a plea offer or proceed to trial
without it. Substantial disparities therefore exist in the bargaining power
and decision-making ability of criminal defendants, depending on where
they are charged.
This Note addresses the divide in how courts approach Brady challenges
to guilty pleas. After analyzing the development of plea bargaining and the
Brady rule, this Note concludes that a guilty plea is not valid if made
without awareness of material exculpatory evidence possessed by the
prosecution. To provide additional support for the recognition of pre–
guilty plea exculpatory Brady rights, this Note presents a case study of two
2012 Supreme Court decisions establishing the right to effective assistance
of counsel during plea bargaining, and argues that the same justifications
for recognizing that right during plea bargaining apply to Brady as well.
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“And it would be foolish to think that ‘constitutional’ rules governing
counsel’s behavior will not be followed by rules governing the
prosecution’s behavior in the plea-bargaining process that the Court today
announces ‘is the criminal justice system.’”1

INTRODUCTION
A grocery store clerk is robbed at gunpoint on a Friday night, and two
hours later police arrest twenty-four year old Chris, who lives nearby.2
Chris is charged in the robbery, and two weeks before his trial is set to start,
Chris and the prosecutor meet to discuss a guilty plea. Chris maintains his
innocence, but the prosecutor tells Chris that she has video surveillance
footage of the robbery showing a masked robber matching his medium
build, and a search of his apartment revealed a drawer full of cash and a
gun. The prosecutor says that if he agrees to plead guilty, she will reduce
the charges and recommend only a one-year prison sentence. However, if
Chris refuses to plead guilty, the prosecutor threatens to charge him with
the highest degree of armed robbery, in addition to a slew of other charges.
Furthermore, she says she will recommend the maximum sentence for every
charge, totaling over twenty years in prison. Wishing to avoid the
possibility of such a harsh sentence, Chris pleads guilty.
While in prison, Chris discovers that the police arrested another man five
miles away from the grocery store on the night of the robbery for driving
while intoxicated. In his car, this man had a mask matching the one in the
surveillance video and a large amount of cash, with no explanation of where
he got the money. Chris believes that this evidence casts doubt on his guilt,
and would not have pled guilty had he known about it, so he files a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus to have his guilty plea vacated. Whether or not
Chris has the ability to challenge his plea, however, depends entirely on
where his trial took place. In some jurisdictions, Chris could have his guilty
plea vacated if the court found that the prosecution failed to disclose
1. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. The facts described in this Introduction are hypothetical.
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evidence establishing his factual innocence. In others, the prosecution has
no such duty of disclosure, and Chris would be forced to serve his sentence,
unable to challenge his plea. The evidence of the other man’s arrest would
have been disclosed at trial in any jurisdiction, but Chris waived his right to
trial when he was confronted with the evidence against him and the threat
of a severe prison sentence.
While a full criminal trial has long been considered the “gold standard of
American justice,”3 the criminal justice system is now primarily a system of
pleas.4 In 2009, 97 percent of federal convictions and 94 percent of state
convictions were obtained through guilty pleas.5 Despite that shift, some
constitutional protections afforded to defendants at trial have not been
applied during plea bargaining. One traditionally trial-based right that has
not been extended to plea bargaining is Brady disclosure.6 Under the Brady
rule, the prosecution’s failure to disclose at trial any exculpatory or
impeachment evidence that is material to punishment or guilt constitutes a
violation of the defendant’s due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.7 The Supreme Court has yet to recognize a
similar disclosure duty during plea negotiations.8
There is a circuit split on whether a defendant may raise a Brady
violation to challenge a guilty plea for the failure to divulge material
exculpatory evidence.9 In 2002, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Ruiz10 that a guilty plea could not be vacated due to the prosecution’s
failure to disclose impeachment evidence.11 However, a dispute remains
regarding whether a defendant may challenge a guilty plea for the
prosecution’s suppression of material exculpatory evidence.12 Every
subsequent circuit court decision regarding the duty to divulge exculpatory
evidence during plea bargaining has been guided by each court’s own
interpretation of Ruiz.13 These interpretations have led to opposing
conclusions on whether the Brady rule applies to the disclosure of
exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining.14
This Note seeks to resolve the circuit split as to whether a defendant may
raise a post–guilty plea exculpatory Brady challenge. Part I introduces the
Brady rule and outlines the current role of plea bargaining in the U.S.
3. Lafler, at 1398.
4. Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms,
126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 151 (2012).
5. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
6. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Brady, Trust, and Error, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 447, 459
(2012).
7. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
8. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 286 (4th Cir. 2010).
9. Wiseman, supra note 6, at 458. This Note will refer to such a challenge as an
“exculpatory Brady challenge.”
10. 536 U.S. 622, 632 (2002).
11. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002).
12. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 992 (2012).
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 458.
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federal court system. Part II details the circuit split regarding a defendant’s
ability to challenge a guilty plea for failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence, and discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz regarding the
prosecutor’s pre-plea duty to divulge impeachment evidence. Part III
presents an analogous case study of the Supreme Court’s recent extension
of constitutional protections to plea bargaining in the context of the right to
effective assistance of counsel. In Part IV, this Note argues that the
nondisclosure of exculpatory Brady evidence should automatically preclude
a valid guilty plea. Additionally, Part IV illustrates why the same principles
that motivated the Supreme Court to extend effective assistance of counsel
rights to guilty plea defendants support the pre-plea recognition of Brady.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BRADY RULE AND PLEA BARGAINING
The key to resolving the circuit split on the availability of a Brady
challenge to contest a guilty plea is not a myopic focus on the evolution of
Brady and its progeny. Rather, this question is best addressed by also
examining the current role of plea bargaining in the U.S. legal system and
the ramifications of allowing or barring post-plea Brady challenges. This
part first introduces Brady v. Maryland15 and the evolution of the Brady
rule. It then discusses the process of plea bargaining and the function that
process currently plays in the U.S. criminal justice system. This part
concludes by presenting policy reasons for and against allowing post–guilty
plea exculpatory Brady challenges.
A. The Brady Rule
In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution in a criminal trial
has a duty to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defense and material
to guilt or sentencing.16 This rule was not a stark departure from earlier
jurisprudence; rather, it was a natural step in defining the rights afforded to
a criminal defendant.17 Brady reflected an understanding that the role of
the prosecutor is not purely adversarial, because the prosecutor “is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
. . . whose interest . . . in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done.”18 In the eyes of the Supreme Court, the
Brady rule helped perform the crucial function of ensuring that a criminal
defendant was not deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.19 The Supreme Court went on to define the contours of the Brady
rule in a number of subsequent cases. These cases defined what kinds of

15. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
16. Id. at 87.
17. See Adam M. Harris, Note, Two Constitutional Wrongs Do Not Make a Right:
Double Jeopardy and Prosecutorial Misconduct Under the Brady Doctrine, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 931, 934–35 (2006).
18. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
19. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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evidence had to be disclosed, the standard of materiality, and when Brady
claims may be raised.20
1. The Duty To Disclose: Brady v. Maryland
The Brady rule defines one aspect of the prosecution’s evidentiary
disclosure requirements during a criminal trial. The Supreme Court first
established a prosecutor’s constitutional obligations during discovery in
Mooney v. Holohan, where the Court held that due process is violated if the
government knowingly uses perjured testimony to obtain a conviction.21
The duty pronounced in Mooney was further developed in Napue v. Illinois,
where the Court overturned a conviction because the knowing use of
perjured testimony may have affected the outcome of the trial.22
The government’s discovery obligations coalesced into a distinct
defendant’s right in Brady,23 where defendant John Brady and his
companion Charles Boblit separately stood trial for the killing of a man
during a robbery.24 Before trial, Brady’s attorney asked the prosecution to
divulge Boblit’s extrajudicial statements.25 The prosecution provided
Brady with some of the statements but withheld one in which Boblit
admitted committing the actual homicide.26 At trial, Brady’s attorney
conceded murder in the first degree and asked only that the jury return a
verdict without a death sentence.27 Both Brady and Boblit, however, were
sentenced to death.28
The Supreme Court held that the government’s failure to divulge Boblit’s
statement upon request violated Brady’s right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.29 The Court set out what became known as the
Brady rule, which requires that the government provide the defendant any
evidence at trial that is material to either guilt or punishment.30 The
holding was not intended to punish to society or the prosecutor for any
misdeeds, even if the suppression of evidence was willful.31 Rather, the
holding in Brady came from the Court’s belief that a defendant could not be
justly deprived of his life, liberty, or property, without being presented with
all material, exculpatory evidence held by the prosecution.32 The Court
further noted that society is served not only by the conviction of criminals
20. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
21. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
22. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959).
23. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
24. Id. at 84.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 86–87.
30. Id. at 87; see also Michael Serota, Stare Decisis and the Brady Doctrine, 5 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 415, 417 (2011).
31. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
32. See id. at 87–88.
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but also when trials are fair, and that “our system of the administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”33
2. Development of the Rule
After Brady, the Supreme Court went on to define the contours of the
prosecution’s disclosure obligations in a number of decisions. While Brady
was concerned with exculpatory evidence—information that the defense
could use to prove the defendant’s innocence—in Giglio v. United States,34
the Court considered the suppression of evidence that went to the
impeachment of witnesses against the defendant.35
The Court held in Giglio that where guilt or innocence may rest on the
reliability of a witness, the suppression of evidence impugning that
witness’s credibility violates due process.36 Giglio thus defined two types
of material that must be disclosed under Brady: impeachment evidence and
exculpatory evidence.37 Impeachment evidence goes to the credibility of
witnesses and may include evidence revealing that a witness has a bias or
was offered leniency in exchange for testimony and cooperation.38
Exculpatory evidence, on the other hand, establishes the factual innocence
of the defendant, such as video footage of the crime or DNA left at the
scene.39 Some evidence may be both exculpatory and impeaching, such as
inconsistent statements from a witness regarding the perpetrator of a
crime.40 Additionally, after Giglio the Supreme Court has traditionally
treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence identically: the analysis of a
Brady violation has been the same whether the undisclosed evidence was
However, the equal treatment of
impeachment or exculpatory.41
impeachment and exculpatory evidence arguably changed after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Ruiz, which some courts have viewed as creating a
distinction between the two in the plea bargaining context.42
The scope of the evidence required to be disclosed under Brady, and the
situations in which it must be disclosed, has continued to expand after

33. Id. at 87.
34. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
35. See id. at 154; see also Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel,
and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1423,
1462 (2001).
36. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; see also Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Implicit Plea
Agreements and Brady Disclosure, 22 CRIM. JUST. 50 (2007) (discussing the scope of the
Court’s holding in Giglio).
37. See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 496 (2001).
38. R. Michael Cassidy, Plea Bargaining, Discovery, and the Intractable Problem of
Impeachment Disclosures, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1429, 1437–38 (2011).
39. Douglass, supra note 37, at 480.
40. Cassidy, supra note 38, at 1438.
41. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (“This Court has rejected any
such distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.”).
42. See infra Part II.B.
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Giglio. In United States v. Agurs,43 the Supreme Court held that Brady
material must be disclosed even in the absence of a specific request by the
defendant.44 Agurs noted a subtle shift in the concerns of the Court: while
the Supreme Court in Brady’s predecessors was mainly concerned with
misconduct or misrepresentation by prosecutors, the Court’s concern in
Brady was the injury to the defendant resulting from the nondisclosure of
material exculpatory evidence.45 With this focus, the question became how
to determine materiality or when that injury violated due process. The
Court in Agurs found that, under Brady, “implicit in the requirement of
materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected
the outcome of the trial.”46 The Supreme Court held that the standard of
materiality must reflect the Court’s “overriding concern with the justice of
the finding of guilt.”47 As guilt must be established beyond a reasonable
doubt, the Court found that due process is violated if the undisclosed
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not previously exist.48
The Supreme Court further developed this standard of materiality in
United States v. Bagley,49 where the Court held that evidence is material if
“there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.”50 Bagley’s standard of materiality—which continues to be
applied in the Brady analysis today—was not derived solely from the Brady
line of cases.51 Rather, the Court noted that this standard was used to
determine whether due process was violated by the ineffective assistance of
counsel in Strickland v. Washington.52 The Strickland line of cases
concerns the actions of defense counsel rather than those of the prosecutor,
but continues to share this materiality standard with Brady and its
progeny.53
B. The Practice of Plea Bargaining
Defendants at the plea bargaining stage of the judicial process have not
traditionally been afforded the same constitutional protections as they
receive at trial. This discrepancy has become progressively more
43. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
44. See id. at 110.
45. Id. at 104 n.10; see also Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the Prosecutor’s
Duty To Search the Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1471,
1484 (2003).
46. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
47. Id. at 112. The Court rejected the assertion that the standard of materiality should
focus on the defendant’s ability to prepare for trial, instead of on the importance of the
evidence to the determination of guilt or punishment. Id. at 112 n.20.
48. Id. at 112–13.
49. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
50. Id. at 682.
51. See id. at 681–82.
52. See id. at 682; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
53. See infra notes 386–89, 419–21 and accompanying text.
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problematic, as plea bargains have accounted for an ever-increasing
percentage of the resolutions of criminal cases. This section describes the
development of plea bargaining and outlines the current role that plea
bargaining plays in the federal court system.54
1. The Plea Bargaining Process
While plea bargaining has long been a part of the criminal justice system,
the Supreme Court only recognized it as a constitutional method of
adjudicating criminal cases in the latter half of the twentieth century.55
Despite the prior lack of constitutional grounding, plea bargaining has come
to play a major role in the American judicial process.56 Plea bargaining
occurs before the start of the trial and usually takes the form of a series of
offers and counteroffers between a prosecuting attorney and the defendant
and his attorney.57 There are two broad categories of plea negotiations,
each of which generally entails concessions on the part of both the
prosecution and the defendant:
charge bargaining and sentence
bargaining.58 In charge bargaining, the defendant agrees to plead guilty in
exchange for the dropping of some charges or the decrease in their
severity.59 In sentence bargaining, the prosecution agrees to recommend a
lesser sentence in return for the guilty plea.60 These categories are not
mutually exclusive, and many plea agreements will contain elements of
both.61 In both types of negotiation, the exchange is essentially one in
which the defendant waives his customary trial rights,62 and the prosecution
makes a recommendation to the judge.63 However, the judge is not
required to follow the recommendation of the prosecution and may decide
not to accept a guilty plea.64

54. The question whether plea bargaining is beneficial or detrimental to the U.S. judicial
system is beyond the scope of this Note. For an argument that plea bargaining should be
eliminated, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining As Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979
(1992). For a defense of plea bargaining, see Frank Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining As
Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992).
55. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL § 180 (4th ed. 2008).
56. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
57. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND COMMENTARY 1036 (7th ed. 2004).
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
60. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B)–(C).
61. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 702–03
(2001).
62. These waived trial rights include the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to confront his accusers, present witnesses, and testify on his own behalf. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
63. See Colquitt, supra note 61, at 701–03; see also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705,
719 (1962).
64. See Colquitt, supra note 61, at 697.
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Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides guidelines
for the entry of a guilty plea.65 Before a guilty plea is accepted, the
defendant must appear in court, and the court must be sure that the
defendant understands his rights and the consequences of entering a guilty
plea.66 Courts interpreting this section of Rule 11 have referred to this as
the requirement that a guilty plea be entered “knowingly.”67 The court
must also determine that a guilty plea was given voluntarily68 and that there
was a “factual basis” for the plea.69 These determinations are made during
a plea colloquy, where the court informs the defendant of his rights and the
consequences of his plea and attempts to determine whether the defendant
is acting knowingly and voluntarily.70 If the requirements of Rule 11 are
met, the court may accept a guilty plea.71
While Rule 11 provides the basic framework for guilty plea consideration
in the courts, the Supreme Court has discussed and elaborated upon Rule
11’s requirements in a number of cases reviewing the validity of guilty
pleas. Rather than treating “knowing” and “voluntary” as two separate
criteria, the Court generally treats them as one requirement, asking whether
a guilty plea meets the “knowing and voluntary” standard.72
In addition to expanding on the knowing and voluntary requirement, the
Supreme Court has also defined the context in which this requirement
applies and other characteristics of the plea bargaining process. In
McCarthy v. United States,73 the Court held that if a court does not
expressly confirm that a defendant’s guilty plea is both knowing and
voluntary, the plea is void.74 For a guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary,
the court must determine that the conduct admitted actually constitutes the
offense charged.75 A defendant must understand the nature of the crime of
which he is accused and how that law relates to the factual occurrences to
which he admits.76 The Court also noted that, although plea bargaining
itself is not constitutionally mandated, a finding that the guilty plea was
65. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
66. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1).
67. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 248 (1969).
68. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3).
70. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and
the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 727 (2002).
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3).
72. See, e.g., Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 136 (2009). The term “intelligent”
is also sometimes part of the standard for validity of a guilty plea, either in place of
“knowing” or as a third requirement. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183
(2005).
73. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
74. See id. at 466–67.
75. See id. at 467.
76. See id. at 466–67. This rule was later expanded to require that a defendant
understand the rights he waives by pleading guilty and be fully aware of the nature of the
charges against him. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644–45 (1976). In Henderson, the
plea was found to be involuntary because the defendant was never informed that intent to
cause death was an element of second-degree murder. Id. at 645–46.
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“truly voluntary” is constitutionally required.77 By pleading guilty, a
defendant waives numerous constitutional rights;78 for that waiver to be
valid under the Due Process Clause, the guilty plea must be knowing and
voluntary.79
In addition to establishing the constitutional requirement that a guilty
plea be knowing and voluntary, the Court in McCarthy also held that an
improperly entered guilty plea must be vacated, and the case remanded for
new pleadings.80 The Court reasoned that vacating and remanding was the
only way to guarantee that a defendant is afforded due process and the
procedural safeguards it entails.81 Moreover, this rule prevents the waste of
judicial resources on frivolous attacks of guilty plea convictions where the
original record is inadequate.82
A few months after McCarthy, the Court took the knowing and voluntary
requirement a step further in Boykin v. Alabama.83 The Court held that
because a guilty plea is effectively a waiver of multiple constitutional
rights, such a waiver cannot be presumed from a silent record.84 Rather, a
defendant must make an affirmative showing that he understands the nature
of the charges against him and the waiver that the guilty plea entails, and
wishes to waive those constitutional rights.85 If a guilty plea is not “equally
voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and
is therefore void.”86
While the system of plea bargaining in the United States has been met
with criticism,87 the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the
practice in a later and unrelated Brady case, Brady v. United States.88 The
Court noted that plea bargaining has substantial benefits for both the
defendant and the prosecution.89 For the defendant, a guilty plea is an
opportunity to receive a lesser punishment than he might receive after a full

77. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
78. These rights include the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial,
and the right to confront his accusers. Id.
79. See id. (“For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” (quoting Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938))).
80. See id. at 469.
81. Id. at 472. The Court noted that a postconviction voluntariness hearing would be
especially problematic in cases like the one at bar. Id. at 470–71. Here, the crime required a
“knowing and willful” attempt to commit tax fraud. Id. at 470. At his sentencing hearing,
the defendant stated that his acts were “neglectful” and “inadvertent,” but also stated that he
was pleading guilty with full understanding of the charges and of his own volition. Id. Thus,
the record would have been insufficient to determine whether the plea was actually knowing
and voluntary; pleading anew would be a more just and efficient remedy. See id. at 471.
82. See id. at 472.
83. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
84. Id. at 243.
85. See id. at 242.
86. Id. at 243 n.5.
87. See SALTZBURG, supra note 57, at 1041.
88. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
89. See id. at 752–53.
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trial, and the costs and burdens of trial are eliminated.90 The government
benefits by achieving its goals of punishment and deterrence and from
saving the judicial resources normally expended at trial.91 In light of these
benefits, the Court reaffirmed the holdings of Boykin and McCarthy,
holding that a guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if it is knowing and
voluntary.92 However, the Court also held that a defendant does not need to
have an accurate assessment of the prosecution’s case in order for a plea to
be knowing and voluntary.93
Rule 11 also sets the basic parameters for withdrawal of, or challenges to,
a guilty plea.94 A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea without
justification before the court has accepted the plea.95 Once the court has
accepted the plea, however, withdrawal becomes more difficult. After the
court has accepted the plea but before sentencing, a defendant may
withdraw his plea if the court rejects the plea agreement or the defendant
“can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”96 A guilty
plea cannot be withdrawn after sentencing and may be set aside only by
direct appeal or collateral attack, such as a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.97 However, most guilty plea agreements
include an express waiver of the right to appeal.98
Additionally, the Supreme Court has limited the challenges available
under habeas review.99 In Tollett v. Henderson,100 the Court held that a
guilty plea precludes habeas review of nonjurisdictional “independent
claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior
to the entry of the guilty plea.”101 However, in addition to jurisdictional
challenges, a defendant who pleads guilty does not waive the right to attack
the validity of the guilty plea itself, including challenges to the knowing and
voluntary nature of the plea and claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.102

90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 748.
93. See id. at 756–57.
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)–(e).
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(1).
96. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B).
97. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
98. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor
to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2011).
99. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 465.
100. 411 U.S. 258 (1973).
101. Id. at 267.
102. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 516–17; see also Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain
Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2025–26 (2000).
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2. The Current Role of Plea Bargaining
In 1990, 84 percent of all federal criminal cases prosecuted to conclusion
were resolved by guilty plea.103 By 2011, that number had risen to 97
percent.104 One reason for this increase may be the specter of mandatory
minimum sentences.105 In the past, judges in federal court had the power to
determine criminal sentences.106 This meant that a prosecutor knew that
she could not hold an excessive sentence over a defendant’s head at the plea
bargaining stage as motivation to avoid trial, because the ultimate power to
sentence rested with the judge.107 The discretion afforded to judges has
dwindled, however, with the advent of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.108
Now, judges are constrained by mandatory minimum sentences, and
prosecutors have more power at the plea bargaining stage.109 A prosecutor
often has the ability to charge a defendant with a variety of crimes carrying
longer or shorter sentences; a defendant may therefore be heavily motivated
to accept a prosecutor’s offer to plead guilty to a crime that does not carry a
mandatory minimum, especially if the alternative charge carries a lengthy
sentence.110 In the era of mandatory minimum sentencing, the prosecutor’s
control over the charge amounts to control over a defendant’s sentence.111
A second cause for the increase in guilty pleas may be the practice of
overcharging.112 To convince a defendant to plead guilty, a prosecutor
might threaten to charge him with an offense carrying a harsher sentence
should he decide to go to trial.113 For example, in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes,114 the prosecutor told the defendant that if he did not plead guilty to
the offense charged, which was punishable by two to ten years in prison,
she would seek a new indictment under a state law that carried a mandatory
life sentence.115 Hayes pled not guilty and subsequently received a life
sentence.116 The Supreme Court held that the decision of what crime to
charge was within the discretion of the prosecutor and that charging the
defendant with a more severe crime did not constitute a violation of due
process.117 By sanctioning the practice of overcharging, the Court allowed
103. Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, Federal Guilty Pleas Soar As Bargains Trump
Trials, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723
96390443589304577637610097206808.html.
104. Id.
105. See SALTZBURG, supra note 57, at 1049.
106. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV.
1471, 1475 (1993).
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id.
112. See SALTZBURG, supra note 57, at 1051.
113. See id.
114. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
115. Id. at 358.
116. Id. at 359.
117. Id. at 364–65.
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prosecutors to use harsher sentences as leverage to obtain guilty pleas.118
This technique has now become a common practice,119 leading defendants
to increasingly plead guilty, perhaps to avoid the risk of an extremely harsh
sentence.120 As the percentage of criminal cases being resolved by guilty
plea continues to increase,121 it becomes all the more necessary to establish
proper procedures and safeguards to ensure that pleas are entered fairly and
in a way that does not violate defendants’ constitutional rights.122
C. Why Require Pre-plea Disclosure of Exculpatory Brady Evidence?
As discussed in Part II of this Note, the circuits are split as to whether the
Brady rule applies to exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining.123 This
section first discusses various policy arguments put forth by criminal
defense attorneys and legal commentators in favor of pre-plea Brady
disclosure, and then presents some arguments against expanding Brady.
1. Policy Justifications for Allowing Exculpatory
Brady Challenges to Guilty Pleas
Commentators have put forth a number of different justifications in
pushing for the recognition of exculpatory Brady rights during plea
bargaining.124 First, some argue from a constitutional standpoint that guilty
pleas are not truly knowing and voluntary without the knowledge of
material exculpatory evidence.125 These commentators argue that the
decision to plead guilty rests substantially on the defendant’s assessment of
the strength of the prosecution’s case, not on whether he actually committed
the crime.126 A plea therefore cannot be knowing and voluntary if it is
made without knowledge of material exculpatory evidence.127

118. Stephanos Bibas, Pleas’ Progress, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1024, 1039 (2004).
119. See Jeremy Root, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Reconsideration of the Lackey
Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 293 (2002).
120. See Ana Maria Gutiérrez, The Sixth Amendment: The Operation of Plea Bargaining
in Contemporary Criminal Procedure, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 695, 717 (2010).
121. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl.5.22.2010, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010
.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
122. See Gutiérrez, supra note 120, at 717–18; Nancy J. King, Regulating Settlement:
What Is Left of the Rule of Law in the Criminal Process?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 389, 395–96
(2007).
123. See infra Part II.
124. See Blank, supra note 102, at 2040. While the complete breadth of justifications for
pre-plea Brady challenges is too vast to be addressed here, some key arguments are
presented.
125. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process,
40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 964 (1989); see also Blank, supra note 102, at 2040.
126. Douglass, supra note 37, at 466.
127. See id. at 466–68. The idea that Brady violations preclude knowing and voluntary
pleas was highly influential in the Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow pre-plea Brady
challenges. See infra Part II.A.5.
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Other commentators have advocated for a plea bargaining disclosure
requirement based on a contract analysis. They argue that because a guilty
plea agreement is essentially a contract, the doctrines of duress and mistake
weigh in favor of pre-plea disclosure of exculpatory evidence.128 General
appeals to fairness motivate the desire for Brady disclosure during plea
bargaining as well: if the true goal of the criminal process is justice, then a
prosecutor’s suppression of exculpatory evidence to coerce a defendant to
plead guilty directly contravenes that goal.129 Moreover, as Brady
disclosures are required at trial, fairness dictates that the same requirements
apply during plea bargaining.130
Perhaps the most salient argument that commentators have raised in
favor of requiring the pre-plea disclosure of material exculpatory evidence
is the fear that, without such a requirement, innocent defendants are
compelled to plead guilty.131 While some argue that innocent defendants
will not plead guilty, the reality is that when faced with the alternative
possibilities of a life sentence or a few years in prison, an innocent
defendant might plead guilty to minimize that risk if he is unaware that the
prosecution possesses exculpatory evidence.132 Moreover, prosecutors are
more likely to suppress exculpatory evidence when they have a weak
case—when the defendant is most likely to be innocent—because they
would rather secure even a minimal conviction than lose the case
altogether.133 Thus, the coercive effect of withholding exculpatory
evidence is at its apex when the defendant is innocent.134
Brady disclosure levels the playing field between the prosecutor and the
defendant: by forcing disclosure of exculpatory evidence, a prosecutor
cannot bluff her way to a conviction by misrepresenting the strength of the
government’s case.135 Bluffing, mandatory minimum sentencing, and the
practice of overcharging all act to compel innocent defendants to plead
guilty, as defendants seek to minimize the risk of a lengthy sentence.136
Prosecutors, on the other hand, seek to maximize the number of convictions
but are less concerned with the length of the sentence imposed.137 When
disclosure is required, defendants are less susceptible to coercion, as they
have accurate information about the strength of the prosecution’s case and

128. Blank, supra note 102, at 2041; see Eleanor J. Ostrow, Comment, The Case for
Preplea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581, 1609 (1981). See generally Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1926 (1992).
129. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 441–42.
130. See McMunigal, supra note 125, at 1010.
131. See id. at 963–64 (referring to the problem of innocent defendants pleading guilty as
“accuracy” in pleading); see also Douglass, supra note 37, at 441.
132. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 448.
133. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1152 (2008).
134. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 449.
135. See Blank, supra note 102, at 2072.
136. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 448–49; see also McMunigal, supra note 125, at
989.
137. Bowers, supra note 133, at 1128.
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the relative risk of going to trial.138 One goal of the criminal justice system
is to protect innocent people from being punished; by requiring pre-plea
Brady disclosure, the risk of innocent defendants pleading guilty is
substantially abated.139
2. Arguments Against Applying Brady During Plea Bargaining
Scholarly argument against requiring disclosure of material exculpatory
evidence prior to a guilty plea has been minimal.140 Some have argued that
few innocent people are actually accused of crimes and that those who are
will never actually plead guilty.141 Moreover, for guilty defendants, the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence allows them to bargain for a lesser
sentence than they actually deserve under the law.142 Others argue that
while substantial information should be disclosed prior to a guilty plea,
Brady’s narrow materiality standard provides too minimal a protection.143
Additionally, there is a fear that if exculpatory evidence is required to be
disclosed prosecutors will soon have to turn over their entire case to the
defendant, thus negating the efficiency and expediency provided by plea
bargaining.144 As is evident from the circuit court decisions holding that
pre-plea Brady disclosure is not required, however, these policy arguments
against disclosure give way to more substantial constitutional and
precedential obstacles.145
II. BRADY CHALLENGES TO GUILTY PLEAS: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Part II of this Note discusses the circuit split regarding the use of the
Brady rule to challenge a guilty plea for the failure to divulge exculpatory
evidence. The Supreme Court resolved one aspect of this split in Ruiz,
where the Court held that a defendant could not raise a Brady violation
where the prosecution failed to disclose impeachment evidence prior to the
entry of a guilty plea.146 The Court did not, however, speak directly on the
failure to divulge exculpatory evidence prior to a guilty plea.147 Every
subsequent circuit court decision on the issue of exculpatory Brady
challenges to guilty pleas has been substantially based on the court’s

138. McMunigal, supra note 125, at 968–73.
139. See id. at 965–67.
140. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 442.
141. See McMunigal, supra note 125, at 964.
142. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 489.
143. See id. at 442. However, Douglass notes that “even a limited rule of disclosure may
be better than none.” Id. at 443.
144. See Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1394 (1991); see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 632
(2002).
145. See infra Part II.
146. See id. at 625.
147. See id.
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interpretation of Ruiz’s holding.148 However, these interpretations have
differed greatly, creating a new circuit split. To resolve this split, the
meaning of Ruiz must be understood not only in the context of the Brady
rule, but in the larger picture of what rights are afforded to a criminal
defendant at different stages of the judicial process.
A. The Pre-Ruiz Split
Before Ruiz, the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits held
that a defendant may raise a Brady challenge to a guilty plea. However, the
reasoning supporting these decisions varied: some courts have found that
Brady violations render guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary,149 while
others found that suppression of Brady material constitutes an exception to
the “knowing and voluntary” rule for the validity of a guilty plea.150
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit held that a guilty plea precludes a Brady
challenge, and the Eighth Circuit later went against its earlier decision and
held the same.151 While the Supreme Court answered some questions
raised by this split in Ruiz, others remain unanswered: Ruiz addressed only
the question of impeachment Brady material, which until then had been
viewed as equivalent to exculpatory material for purposes of Brady
challenges.152 This section chronologically details the circuit split before
Ruiz, and the principles underlying the different circuit’s positions on Brady
challenges to guilty pleas.
1. The Sixth Circuit Allows a Post-plea Brady Challenge
In Campbell v. Marshall, the Sixth Circuit became the first court to
decide whether a defendant may raise a Brady challenge to a guilty plea.153
The Sixth Circuit held that a Brady violation could potentially negate the
voluntary and knowing character of a guilty plea.154 However, the court
found that a Brady violation was just one part of the analysis of a guilty
plea’s validity and was not always sufficient on its own to preclude a plea’s
knowing and voluntary nature.155 In addition to suppression of Brady
material, the court also looked at the factual basis for the plea, the
148. See, e.g., United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 2009); McCann v.
Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1994).
150. See, e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320–21 (2d Cir. 1988).
151. See infra Part II.A.2, A.5. The Eighth Circuit contradicted itself, first allowing postplea Brady challenges and then holding the opposite shortly after.
152. See Alexandra Natapoff, Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the
Criminal System, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 965, 981 (2008). Before Ruiz, the circuit courts’
disposition of Brady questions during plea bargaining did not depend on whether the
evidence in question went to impeachment of witnesses or the defendant’s factual innocence.
See id.
153. 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985).
154. See id. at 318–24; see also Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady
v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 10 (2002).
155. Campbell, 769 F.2d at 321–24. The court ruled that the pre-plea suppression of
Brady material was not a per se constitutional violation. See id. at 322.
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procedures used by the court in accepting the plea, and the effectiveness of
Campbell’s attorney.156
Under this totality-of-the-circumstances approach, the Sixth Circuit
ultimately held that the prosecutor’s improprieties did not invalidate the
defendant’s guilty plea.157 Still, the Sixth Circuit reached the merits of the
post-plea Brady claim, and suggested that under other circumstances, the
failure to divulge material exculpatory evidence could render a guilty plea
invalid.158 Under this approach, even if the court were to find that the
Supreme Court’s guilty plea jurisprudence precluded post-plea Brady
claims by name, the suppression of material exculpatory evidence could
still be a factor that renders a plea unknowing and involuntary.
2. Contradiction in the Eighth Circuit
In two opinions separated by only one year, the Eighth Circuit first
decided a defendant’s Brady challenge to his guilty plea on the merits, then
later held that a guilty plea waived the defendant’s right to assert a Brady
claim.159
a. White v. United States
In the first Eighth Circuit case to address this issue, White v. United
States,160 the court expressly adopted the Sixth Circuit’s framework from
Campbell, holding that a defendant in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
could attack the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea based on
the suppression of material evidence.161 The court quoted Campbell for the
proposition that “the Supreme Court did not intend to insulate all
misconduct of constitutional proportions from judicial scrutiny solely
because that misconduct was followed by a plea which otherwise passes
constitutional muster as knowing and intelligent.”162 The court therefore
permitted collateral attacks on guilty pleas based on the failure to disclose
exculpatory Brady evidence.163

156. See id. at 321–22.
157. See id. at 324; see also Lain, supra note 154, at 10.
158. See Campbell, 769 F.2d at 324; see also Douglass, supra note 37, at 517.
159. See id. at 6.
160. 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988). The Brady material in this case was impeachment
evidence, rather than exculpatory, as it went to the credibility of the key witness against the
defendant. See id. at 423. Though White’s claim could not have been heard after Ruiz, see
infra note 241 and accompanying text, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning was nearly identical to
the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Campbell, which concerned exculpatory Brady material. See
infra Part II.A.1.
161. See White, 858 F.2d at 421–22.
162. Id. at 422.
163. See id.; see also Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the
Guilty Plea Process: A Debate on the Merits of “Discovery” Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV.
567, 573 n.43 (1999).
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Following the Sixth Circuit’s lead, the Eighth Circuit analyzed the
validity of White’s plea under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach.164
Like the Sixth Circuit in Campbell, the court sought to determine whether
White’s knowledge of the withheld information would have “affected his
decision to forego trial.”165 The Eighth Circuit found that the undisclosed
Brady material would not have been controlling in White’s decision
whether to plead guilty or proceed to trial.166 Additionally, the court held
that the benefit conferred to White by pleading guilty weighed in favor of
the finding that he would have pled guilty even with the suppressed
evidence.167 As White had previously stated at his plea hearing that it was
in his “best interest to terminate all of the litigation as quickly as possible,”
the court found it unlikely that knowledge of the suppressed material would
have changed his decision.168 Despite the ruling against White, this case
appeared to establish in the Eighth Circuit a defendant’s ability to raise a
Brady claim to challenge a guilty plea for nondisclosure of exculpatory
evidence.169
b. Smith v. United States
The Eighth Circuit quickly changed course in Smith v. United States,
decided less than one year after White.170 In a very brief opinion, the court
declined to reach the merits of Smith’s claim, holding that by pleading
guilty Smith had waived all challenges “except those related to
jurisdiction.”171 The court made no mention of its previous precedent in
White or of the Brady rule.172 By declining to reach the merits of Smith’s
Brady challenge to his guilty plea, the Eighth Circuit split from the Sixth
(and from its previous holding in White).
3. The Second Circuit’s Approach: Suppression of Material Evidence
As Official Misconduct
In Miller v. Angliker, the Second Circuit joined the Sixth in allowing a
defendant to challenge the validity of a guilty plea for the failure of the
prosecution to disclose material exculpatory evidence, but on a different
legal theory.173 The court found that a guilty plea is valid if it is both
164. White, 858 F.2d at 422.
165. Id. at 424.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. See Lain, supra note 154, at 6 n.23.
170. 876 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1989).
171. Id. at 657.
172. See id.
173. 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988). This case actually involved a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity. Id. at 1319. However, the Second Circuit decided that in determining
whether Miller could raise a Brady challenge, it would treat his plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity like a guilty plea. Id. The court reasoned that both pleas waived certain rights
normally held by the defendant at trial, including the right to argue that he did not commit
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intelligent and voluntary.174 However, the court found that this test only
applies so long as there is no “misrepresentation or other impermissible
conduct by state agents.”175 The court proceeded to note that a defendant’s
decision whether or not to plead guilty rested heavily on a determination of
the strength of the prosecution’s case against him, and the availability of
exculpatory evidence.176 The Second Circuit concluded that “even a guilty
plea that was ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ may be vulnerable to challenge if
it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the
prosecution.”177 Applying the materiality standard from Bagley and
Strickland, the court found that there was a reasonable probability that, but
for the suppression of the file, Miller would not have taken the plea
agreement, and would instead have gone to trial.178 Based on that
probability, the suppression of the file violated Miller’s due process rights
under Brady.179
Under the Second Circuit’s analysis, the prosecution’s suppression of
material Brady evidence, while not causing the plea to be unintelligent or
involuntary, nevertheless renders it constitutionally invalid due to
“misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents.”180 This
holding stands in contrast to the Sixth Circuit’s approach in Campbell.181
Both courts reached the merits of the defendants’ Brady claims, but the
Second Circuit viewed Brady violations as an exception to the rule that a
guilty plea must be knowing and voluntary, whereas the Sixth Circuit
viewed Brady violations as having the potential to preclude a knowing and
voluntary plea.182 While this rule has been consistently applied in the
Second Circuit,183 other circuits have identified a different basis for
permitting Brady challenges to guilty pleas in similar situations.

the alleged acts, the right to challenge the validity of his confession, and the right to
introduce any other evidence to cast doubt on his commission of the alleged acts. Id.
174. See id. at 1320 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)).
175. Id. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)).
176. See id.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 1322–24. The Second Circuit noted that the standard for materiality
applied to Brady claims was the same as for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See
id. at 1322. The court held that, in order to show prejudice and invalidate his guilty plea,
Miller had to show that there was a “reasonable probability that but for the withholding of
the information [he] would not have entered the recommended plea but would have insisted
on going to a full trial . . . .” Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1320 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970)).
181. See supra Part II.A.1.
182. See Douglass, supra note 37, at 467 n.125. Compare Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320, with
Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 318–22 (6th Cir. 1985).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998); Tate v. Wood,
963 F.2d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1992).
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4. The Tenth Circuit’s Approach: Suppression of Brady Material
May Preclude a Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea
While the Tenth Circuit joined the Second and Sixth Circuits in allowing
a defendant to raise a Brady challenge to a guilty plea, it supported its
holding with different reasoning. The court first addressed the question in
United States v. Wright,184 where the Tenth Circuit stated that a defendant
who enters a knowing and voluntary guilty plea “waives all nonjurisdictional challenges to his conviction.”185 This language closely
mirrors the Eighth Circuit’s language in Smith, which held that a guilty plea
precluded Brady challenges.186 However, rather than foreclosing upon
Wright’s ability to raise a Brady challenge, the Tenth Circuit held that
Wright could challenge his conviction by asserting that he did not enter his
plea intelligently or voluntarily due to the claimed Brady violation.187 The
court noted that a defendant who pleads guilty may still challenge that plea
as being the “product of prosecutorial threats, misrepresentations, or
improper promises,” which go directly to the knowing and voluntary nature
of the plea.188 According to the Tenth Circuit, failure to divulge Brady
material is a form of “misrepresentation” with the potential to render a
“guilty plea a constitutionally inadequate basis for imprisonment.”189
Whereas the Second Circuit in Miller found that official misconduct—the
government’s failure to turn over Brady evidence—was an exception to the
“voluntary and intelligent” test for the validity of a guilty plea, the Tenth
Circuit reasoned that such misconduct can undercut the intelligent or
voluntary nature of the plea.190 In essence, the court found that a defendant
may be incapable of entering a truly voluntary guilty plea if he is unaware
of material evidence in his favor that weakens the prosecution’s case
against him.191 The court also reasoned that allowing Brady challenges to
guilty pleas was justified by “the importance to the integrity of our criminal
justice system that guilty pleas be knowing and intelligent.”192
In discussing materiality, the Tenth Circuit held that Brady evidence was
material “only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”193 A “reasonable probability” was a probability “sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.”194 The court ultimately held that
184. 43 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1994).
185. Id. at 494.
186. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
187. See Wright, 43 F.3d at 494.
188. Id. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Id. at 497 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 (1977)). Notably, the
Tenth Circuit found that a Brady violation can render a guilty plea unknowing and
involuntary only “under certain limited circumstances.” Id. at 496.
190. See id. at 495; see also Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988).
191. See Wright, 43 F.3d at 496; see also Lain, supra note 154, at 12.
192. Wright, 43 F.3d at 496.
193. Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
194. Id. (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)).
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Wright’s plea was valid, finding that the prosecution’s failure to disclose
immunity agreements offered to witnesses was not material to guilt or
punishment.195 While the court did not find in Wright’s favor, the decision
solidified the Tenth Circuit’s rule allowing a defendant to challenge a guilty
plea based on a Brady violation.196
5. The Ninth Circuit’s Per Se Rule
In Sanchez v. United States, the Ninth Circuit adopted an even more
expansive view of a defendant’s Brady rights during plea bargaining.197
The Ninth Circuit began by discussing whether a defendant may raise a
Brady claim to vacate a guilty plea, noting that the Second, Sixth, and
Eighth Circuits had already answered in the affirmative.198 The Ninth
Circuit likewise allowed post-plea Brady challenges, finding that a guilty
plea cannot be knowing and voluntary if made without knowledge of
material evidence suppressed by the prosecution.199 However, rather than
following the Sixth Circuit’s method of considering the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether a guilty plea was valid, the Ninth
Circuit held that a Brady violation automatically renders a plea unknowing
and involuntary.200 The court found that such a rule makes sense because
“‘a defendant’s decision whether or not to plead guilty is often heavily
influenced by his appraisal of the prosecution’s case.’”201
The court also noted that prohibiting defendants from asserting Brady
claims to challenge guilty pleas would tempt prosecutors to “deliberately
withhold exculpatory information as part of an attempt to elicit guilty
pleas.”202 While the court appeared to believe it was following the other
circuits, it failed to note that the Second Circuit had not found that a Brady
violation prevented a plea from being knowing and voluntary, but had
instead found that a Brady violation constitutes official misconduct that
negates an otherwise knowing and voluntary plea.203
195. See id. at 497.
196. See id.
197. 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995).
198. See id. at 1453.
199. See id.
200. See id. (“A waiver cannot be deemed intelligent and voluntary if entered without
knowledge of material information withheld by the prosecution.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Lain, supra note 154, at 8.
201. Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453 (quoting Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir.
1988)).
202. Id.
203. Compare id. (“Three circuits have held that a defendant can argue that his guilty plea
was not voluntary and intelligent because it was made in the absence of withheld Brady
material.”), with Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e conclude
that even a guilty plea that was ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ may be vulnerable to challenge if
it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the prosecution.”). The
court also adopted the same standard of materiality as the Second Circuit in Miller, finding
that Brady evidence is material only when there is a reasonable probability that the defendant
would not have pleaded guilty had he received the undisclosed information. See Sanchez,
50 F.3d at 1453.
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While the Ninth Circuit did not ultimately find that the government’s
nondisclosure of evidence violated Brady, the test established by this court
was the most defendant-friendly to date.204 Whereas the Sixth Circuit
viewed Brady violations as having the potential to invalidate a guilty plea
under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach,205 the Ninth Circuit
effectively adopted a “per se” rule whereby a Brady violation automatically
precludes a knowing and voluntary plea.206
6. The Fifth Circuit Dissents
In Matthew v. Johnson,207 the Fifth Circuit was the first circuit court to
lay down a full, detailed opinion holding that a defendant could not
challenge the validity of a guilty plea due to a Brady violation. In
considering whether or not to proceed to the merits of Matthew’s Brady
claim, the Fifth Circuit first noted that the Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits had generally held that a defendant could assert a Brady
violation to challenge his guilty plea.208 The court, however, also cited
Smith and two district court cases holding that Brady violations may not be
asserted after a guilty plea.209
The court proceeded to find that the government’s duty under Brady to
disclose material exculpatory evidence is based on the Due Process Clause
and “exists to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial.”210 The court
continued to emphasize the language in Brady that discussed the impact of
withholding evidence on the trial itself, and found that the inclusion of
impeachment evidence in the Brady rule by Giglio was also justified by the
potential detriment to the jury’s determination of guilt.211 Thus the court
framed the Brady rule not as one that promoted fairness and protected
defendants through the criminal justice process,212 but rather as a rule to
ensure proper determinations of guilt at trial.213
The Fifth Circuit also found that the Supreme Court’s materiality
standard in Brady cases demonstrated that the rule was properly confined to
the trial setting.214 The court found, citing Bagley, that a prosecutor was
only required to disclose evidence that was favorable to the defense and, if
suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial.215 This is a
different reading of Bagley’s materiality standard than that of the Tenth
204. See John G. Douglass, Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady v. Maryland and Plea
Bargaining, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 585 (2007).
205. Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1985).
206. See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453; see also Blank, supra note 102, at 2039.
207. 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
208. Id. at 358.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 360 (emphasis added).
211. See id.
212. See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
213. See Matthew, 201 F.3d at 360–61.
214. See id. at 361.
215. Id.
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Circuit and other courts that cite Bagley as holding that evidence is material
if “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to
the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”216
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit found Brady to be purely a trial right, and
“where no trial is to occur, there may be no constitutional violation.”217 By
pleading guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant waived not only his right
to trial but also the right to assert constitutional violations of trial rights.218
In prohibiting Matthew from raising a Brady challenge to invalidate his
plea, the Fifth Circuit also distinguished the cases allowing such challenges
in other circuits.219 Notably, the court found the Second Circuit’s
holding—that a violation occurs if a defendant would have pled differently
had he received the undisclosed information—to be unsupported by
Supreme Court jurisprudence.220 The court found that such an argument
was foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. United States,
where the Court rejected the argument that because the defendant would not
have pled guilty but for the possibility of receiving the death penalty at trial,
his plea was invalid as an involuntary act.221 The Fifth Circuit found that
while some circuits had held that a guilty plea was not knowing or
voluntary if the defendant was not provided with material exculpatory
In McMann v.
evidence, the Supreme Court said otherwise.222
Richardson223 the Court recognized that the decision to plead guilty is
inherently made without complete or accurate information, and in Brady v.
United States224 the Court held that incorrect assessments of the strength of
the government’s case did not preclude a knowing and voluntary plea.225
Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that Brady was purely a trial right, and to
extend it to plea bargaining would go against the Supreme Court’s
established precedents.226
B. United States v. Ruiz
Two years after Matthew, in United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court
decided its first case directly on the question whether a Brady violation
invalidates a guilty plea.227 Defendant Angela Ruiz was arrested in
California for importing marijuana from Mexico into the United States.228
Ruiz was offered a “fast track” plea deal, whereby she would waive
216. See United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Douglass,
supra note 37, at 470–71.
217. Matthew, 201 F.3d at 361.
218. Id. at 362.
219. Id. at 362–63.
220. See id. at 363.
221. Id. at 366 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970)).
222. Id. at 368.
223. 397 U.S. 759, 769 (1970).
224. 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970).
225. See Matthew, 201 F.3d at 368.
226. See id.
227. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002).
228. Id. at 625; see also United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001).
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indictment, trial, and appeal in exchange for the government’s
recommendation to the sentencing judge of a two-level reduction from the
otherwise applicable U.S. Sentencing Guidelines sentence.229 The “fast
track” deal specified that “any [known] information establishing the factual
innocence of the defendant”230 has been disclosed to the defendant and
required the defendant to “waiv[e] the right to receive impeachment
information relating to any informants or other witnesses.”231 Ruiz
declined the offer and was indicted for unlawful drug possession.232
After the indictment, and in the absence of any subsequent plea
agreement, Ruiz pled guilty.233 Ruiz asked the sentencing judge to grant
her the same two-level reduction she would have received under the plea
deal, but the government opposed the request and the district court imposed
the standard Guideline sentence.234 Ruiz appealed her sentence to the Ninth
Circuit, which vacated the district court’s sentence.235 The government
sought certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted the petition.236
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer framed the question as whether
federal prosecutors must disclose material impeachment evidence before
entering into a plea agreement with a criminal defendant.237 Citing Brady,
the Court located this right both in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s “fair trial” guarantee.238 The Court
found that due to the gravity of waiving one’s constitutional trial rights by
pleading guilty, the Constitution required that a guilty plea be entered
knowingly and voluntarily, and with “sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.”239 The Court noted that the Ninth
Circuit had essentially held that a guilty plea is not voluntary unless it is
made with full knowledge of the material impeachment evidence possessed
by the prosecution.240 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the
Constitution does not require the disclosure of impeachment information
before the entry of a guilty plea.241
In support of this holding, the Court first found that impeachment
information, while special in relation to the fairness of the trial, was not

229. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625. In this case, that meant a reduction from an eighteen-totwenty-four month range to a twelve-to-eighteen month range. Id.
230. In other words, exculpatory Brady material.
231. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This clause refers to
impeachment Brady material, included in the Brady rule by Giglio. See supra notes 36–40
and accompanying text.
232. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.
233. Id. at 625–26.
234. Id. at 626.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 625.
238. Id. at 628 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
239. Id. at 629 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
240. Id.
241. See id.
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significant to whether a guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.242 Noting
that the Constitution does not confer a general right to criminal discovery,
the Court found that a plea is ordinarily considered valid if the defendant
“fully understands the nature of the right [he waives] and how it would
likely apply in general in the circumstances—even though the defendant
may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.”243 The
Constitution does not require that the government disclose all useful
information to the defendant.244 The Court found that impeachment
evidence was not “critical information of which the defendant must always
be aware prior to pleading guilty,” due to the inconsistent way in which it
tends to help a defendant.245
Affirming the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Matthew,246 the Supreme Court
held that the Constitution does not require that a defendant have complete
knowledge of all relevant circumstances before entering a guilty plea.247
The Court also found that the due process considerations underlying the
Brady rule did not support a rule requiring the disclosure of impeachment
material before pleading guilty.248 The added value of such a rule to the
defendant would be limited, as impeachment information is rarely
crucial.249 Moreover, the Court found little reason to believe that innocent
individuals would plead guilty in the absence of impeachment evidence
because the government was required to disclose “any information
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant” under the “fast track”
plea bargain, and the defendant was still protected by Rule 11.250 The
Court appeared to assume that innocent defendants were very unlikely to
plead guilty.251
The Supreme Court also found that a constitutional rule requiring
disclosure of impeachment information prior to a guilty plea could interfere
with the “[g]overnment’s interest in securing those guilty pleas that are
factually justified, desired by defendants, and help to secure the efficient
administration of justice.”252 The Court agreed with the government’s
warning that such a rule would disrupt investigations and potentially expose
witnesses to harm.253 Such a requirement would also force the government
242. Id.
243. Id. (emphasis in original); see also Bibas, supra note 98, at 1133–34 (discussing the
Supreme Court’s understanding of the voluntariness requirement in Ruiz).
244. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629.
245. Id. at 630.
246. See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 368 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The Court has
explicitly recognized that the decision whether to plead guilty or go to trial is one made
under circumstances of incomplete, and often inaccurate, information.”).
247. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633.
248. See id. at 631.
249. See id. at 630–32.
250. Id. at 631; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
251. Bibas, supra note 98, at 1133. At oral argument, Justice Scalia went so far as to
suggest that “our system never permits or encourages innocent defendants to plead guilty.”
Id. at 1134 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (No. 01-595)).
252. Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 631.
253. Id. at 631–32.
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to expend more time, energy, and manpower on preparation before plea
bargaining, thereby erasing the benefits to judicial expediency which plea
bargaining normally offers.254 In the alternative, the Court feared that the
Ninth Circuit’s rule would result in more cases being sent to trial.255 In
addition to not being in the best interests of the justice system, the Court
held that such a change was not justified by the minimal benefit bestowed
by requiring disclosure of impeachment evidence.256 The Court therefore
held that the Constitution did not require the government to disclose
impeachment evidence before the entry of a guilty plea.257
C. Judicial Interpretation of Ruiz: The New Circuit Split
While the Supreme Court was quite clear in striking down a rule
requiring the pre-plea disclosure of impeachment evidence, it was not clear
from the holding what Ruiz meant for exculpatory evidence.258 Prior to
Ruiz, courts treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence as
While some—including the
“constitutionally indistinguishable.”259
Seventh and Tenth Circuits—have viewed Ruiz as suggesting that the Brady
rule would apply to exculpatory evidence prior to the entry of a plea,260
others—including the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits—have understood
Ruiz to imply a broader rule that the government has no duty to disclose any
Brady material during plea negotiations.261 This section outlines the cases
following Ruiz that address whether the prosecution must disclose material
exculpatory evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea.
1. Circuits That Find Ruiz Suggests That Failure To Disclose Material
Exculpatory Evidence Violates Due Process
The first two circuit courts to address this question after Ruiz both held
that exculpatory evidence, unlike impeachment evidence, had to be
disclosed prior to the entry of a guilty plea. This section discusses these
cases and their interpretation of Ruiz.

254. See id. at 632.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 633.
258. See Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 273
(2006).
259. Natapoff, supra note 152, at 981.
260. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 258, at 273 n.200 (collecting cases); Kevin C.
McMunigal, Guilty Pleas, Brady Disclosure, and Wrongful Convictions, 57 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 651, 654 (2007) (“In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz, the American
College of Trial Lawyers proposed modifying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 to
impose a duty to disclose exculpatory information in the guilty plea context.”).
261. See infra Part II.C.2.
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a. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit was the first to address the application of Brady to
plea bargaining after Ruiz in McCann v. Mangialardi.262 In discussing
McCann’s Brady claim, the court noted that the Supreme Court had not yet
addressed whether disclosure of material exculpatory evidence was required
outside the trial context.263 The court viewed Ruiz as drawing a major
distinction between impeachment information—which was “special in
relation to the fairness of the trial, not in respect to whether a plea is
voluntary”264—and exculpatory evidence, which was at issue in
McCann.265 Because of this distinction, the Seventh Circuit found that the
question whether a guilty plea can be voluntary266 when it is made without
knowledge of material exculpatory evidence was not directly answered by
Ruiz.267
The Seventh Circuit held that Ruiz “strongly suggests” that the
government is required to disclose material exculpatory information prior to
a guilty plea.268 The court found that the Supreme Court’s reasoning for
not requiring disclosure of impeachment information was that such
impeachment information was unlikely to be “critical information of which
the defendant must always be aware prior to pleading guilty.”269
Additionally, the disclosure of impeachment information was not required
in Ruiz because the plea agreement already specified that the government
would provide material exculpatory evidence.270 The Seventh Circuit held
that this language created a distinction between impeachment and
exculpatory evidence, and therefore indicated that the Supreme Court would
find a due process violation if the government withheld material
exculpatory evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea.271
Ultimately, however, the Seventh Circuit found that it did not have to
actually resolve the issue, because McCann had not presented evidence to
show that Mangialardi actually new about the cocaine being planted in his
car.272 Still, the Seventh Circuit set the foundation for interpretation of Ruiz
and pre-plea Brady requirements.

262. 337 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2003).
263. See id. at 787.
264. Id. (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)).
265. See id. In McCann, the exculpatory evidence consisted of the defendant’s alleged
knowledge that the cocaine found in the plaintiff’s car was planted there. Id. at 784.
266. Voluntary was defined by the Supreme Court in Ruiz and by the Seventh Circuit here
as “knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware.” Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629; McCann, 337 F.3d
at 787 (internal quotation marks omitted).
267. McCann, 337 F.3d at 787.
268. Id.
269. Id. (quoting Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630) (emphasis omitted).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 788.
272. Id.
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b. The Tenth Circuit
Ten years after its decision in United States v. Wright,273 the Tenth
Circuit once again addressed the viability of post–guilty plea Brady
challenges in United States v. Ohiri.274 While the district court had held
that Ohiri could not establish a Brady violation prior to the entry of his
guilty plea, the Tenth Circuit disagreed.275 The district court relied on Ruiz,
which it viewed as holding that “the government is not required to produce
all Brady material when a defendant pleads guilty.”276 The Tenth Circuit,
however, found that Ruiz did not absolve the government of its disclosure
responsibilities in this case.277
The court first highlighted the Supreme Court’s statement that
“‘impeachment evidence is special in relation to the fairness of a trial,’ not
in respect to whether a plea is voluntary.”278 Like the Seventh Circuit in
McCann,279 the Tenth Circuit used this passage to draw a distinction
between impeachment and exculpatory evidence: exculpatory evidence is
“‘critical information of which the defendant must always be aware prior to
pleading guilty,’”280 while impeachment evidence is not.281 Moreover, the
Tenth Circuit found that the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence prior to a
guilty plea was supported by the Supreme Court’s statement that Ruiz’s
constitutional Brady rights were protected by the plea agreement’s
stipulation that she would receive all material exculpatory evidence.282
The Tenth Circuit also found that Ruiz was distinguishable from the case
at bar in two ways.283 First, the withheld evidence in this case was
exculpatory, whereas the evidence in Ruiz was impeachment evidence.284
Second, the court found a significant difference between the “fast track”
plea in Ruiz, which was offered before an indictment, and the plea
agreement offered to Ohiri on the same day as jury selection.285 The Tenth
Circuit understood the Supreme Court’s holding in Ruiz as being relatively
narrow: that there was no due process violation in requiring a defendant to
waive the disclosure of impeachment evidence before indictment.286 This
did not, however, imply that the government could withhold material
exculpatory evidence if the defendant accepts a last-minute plea deal.287
273. 43 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1994).
274. 133 F. App’x 555 (10th Cir. 2005).
275. See id. at 562.
276. Id. at 561.
277. Id. at 562.
278. Id. (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)).
279. See supra notes 264–65 and accompanying text.
280. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x at 562 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630
(2002)).
281. See id.
282. Id. (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002)).
283. See id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. See id.
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The Tenth Circuit cited McCann as holding the same, and also as
understanding Ruiz to suggest that exculpatory evidence must be disclosed
prior to a guilty plea.288 The court therefore held that post–guilty plea
Brady challenges for suppression of exculpatory evidence were permitted
after Ruiz.289
2. Circuits That Find Ruiz Precludes All Brady Challenges to Guilty Pleas
In United States v. Conroy, the Fifth Circuit once again disagreed with
the other circuits, mirroring the split that existed before Ruiz.290 One year
later in United States v. Moussaoui,291 the Fourth Circuit indicated that it
might follow suit, but its holding was not an outright endorsement of
Conroy. The Second Circuit also suggested in dictum, in Friedman v.
Rehal,292 that it might reverse course from Miller and its progeny. This
section discusses these three cases and the circuit split as it currently exists.
a. The Fifth Circuit
Nine years after its decision in Matthew v. Johnson,293 the Fifth Circuit
once again held that a guilty plea precludes a Brady challenge in Conroy.294
The court declined to reach the merits of Conroy’s Brady claim, finding that
it was precluded by Ruiz and Matthew.295 First, the court reviewed its
holding in Matthew, where it found that the Brady rule was only intended to
ensure that the defendant received a fair trial, and that it did not apply when
an individual waived his trial rights.296 In addition, the court cited a
number of Fifth Circuit decisions following Matthew that also found that a
guilty plea waives the right to claim a Brady violation.297
In further support of its holding, the Fifth Circuit found that the Supreme
Court in Ruiz had declined to extend Brady rights to guilty pleas.298 The
Fifth Circuit did not see Ruiz as creating (or even implying) a distinction
between impeachment and exculpatory evidence, but rather as precluding
all post–guilty plea Brady claims.299 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held
that Conroy’s Brady claim was precluded under Ruiz and Matthew, and that

288. See id.; see also McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
289. See Ohiri, 133 F. App’x at 561–62.
290. 567 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2009).
291. 591 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010).
292. 618 F.3d 142 (2d Cir. 2010).
293. See supra Part II.A.6.
294. 567 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2009).
295. Id. at 178–79; see also supra Part II.A.6.
296. See Conroy, 567 F.3d at 178; see also Part II.A.6.
297. See Conroy, 567 F.3d at 178 (citing United States v. Santa Cruz, 297 F. App’x 300
(5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Alvarez-Ocanegra, 180 F. App’x 535 (5th Cir. 2006);
Orman v. Cain, 228 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2000)).
298. Conroy, 567 F.3d at 179.
299. See id.
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a defendant may not challenge a guilty plea for the suppression of
impeachment or exculpatory evidence.300
b. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit’s first substantial discussion of post-plea Brady
challenges after Ruiz occurred in Moussaoui.301 While the court ultimately
found that it did not have to decide the Brady issue, a few points in dictum
suggest that the Fourth Circuit would side with the Fifth in finding that Ruiz
precluded all Brady challenges to guilty pleas.302 First, the court held that
Brady was purely a trial right, existing to “preserve the fairness of a trial
verdict.”303 The court found that when a defendant pleads guilty, the
concerns of maintaining a fair trial and not convicting an innocent
defendant are “almost completely eliminated because his guilt is
admitted.”304
The Fourth Circuit also acknowledged that Ruiz did not directly address
the question of whether a defendant may challenge his guilty plea for
suppression of exculpatory evidence.305 However, the court noted that the
Supreme Court had recognized in Ruiz and previous cases that due process
did not require the disclosure of all useful information prior to a guilty plea
and that pleas may be valid despite inaccurate knowledge of the strength of
the government’s case.306 Furthermore, the court cited with approval a
previous Fourth Circuit case decided shortly after Ruiz, holding that “the
prosecutor’s failure to disclose information potentially relevant as
mitigation evidence” prior to the entry of a guilty plea, did not invalidate
the plea.307 Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s decision appears to be in line with
the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Conroy, finding that Ruiz confined Brady to
the trial setting.308
c. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit’s decision in Miller,309 allowing a post-plea Brady
challenge for the suppression of exculpatory evidence, was followed by a
number of Second Circuit cases allowing both impeachment and

300. See id.
301. 591 F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 2010).
302. See Wiseman, supra note 12, at 994.
303. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d at 285 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002);
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
304. Id. at 285.
305. Id. at 286.
306. Id.
307. Id. (citing Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 315 n.5 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also
Wiseman, supra note 12, at 994.
308. See Cassidy, supra note 38, at 1444 n.67.
309. 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988).
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exculpatory Brady challenges to guilty pleas.310 The Second Circuit had a
chance to revisit this issue after Ruiz in Friedman, and although the court
did not fully reverse its course,311 it suggested that it interpreted Ruiz as
precluding all post-plea Brady challenges.312
In Friedman, the Second Circuit viewed Ruiz as reaffirming the
precedent from Brady that a defendant is entitled to information that is
necessary to ensure a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.313 The court
understood Ruiz to hold that because impeachment information is relevant
only to the fairness of the trial, and not to the voluntariness of the plea, the
failure to disclose such information prior to a guilty plea does not violate
due process.314
The Second Circuit found that the undisclosed evidence in this case was
impeachment evidence and therefore not subject to disclosure requirements
after Ruiz.315 However, the court noted that even if the suppressed evidence
had been exculpatory, Friedman’s challenge would still be precluded by
Ruiz.316 While the court found that Ruiz did not expressly overrule
Miller,317 the Second Circuit held that, because the Supreme Court “has
consistently treated exculpatory and impeachment evidence in the same
way for the purpose of defining the obligation of a prosecutor to provide
Brady material prior to trial,” the holding in Ruiz likely applied to both
impeachment and exculpatory evidence.318 Furthermore, the court found
that the reasoning underlying Ruiz supported such a ruling.319
The circuit courts are thus split as to whether Ruiz permits post–guilty
plea exculpatory Brady challenges.320 On one side, the Seventh and Tenth
Circuits view Ruiz as creating a distinction between impeachment and
exculpatory evidence, requiring the disclosure of the latter, but not the
former, before a defendant enters a guilty plea.321 On the other side, the
Fifth Circuit is cautiously joined by the Second and Fourth Circuits in
understanding Ruiz to preclude all pre–guilty plea Brady claims.322 To
resolve this split and fully define the disclosure rights of defendants during
plea bargaining, the Supreme Court will have to address the specific
310. See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998); Tate v. Wood, 963
F.2d 20, 25 (2d Cir. 1992).
311. The court did not actually decide the issue, as the defendant’s challenge was
untimely. Friedman v. Rehal 618 F.3d 142, 152 (2d Cir. 2010).
312. See id. at 154; see also Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, “Waiving”
Goodbye to Rights:
Plea Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of Competent
Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029, 1039 (2011).
313. Friedman, 618 F.3d at 153; see also supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text.
314. See id. (citing United States v. Ruiz, 563 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)).
315. Id. at 153–54.
316. Id.
317. See id.
318. Id. at 154 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972)).
319. Id.; see also Wiseman, supra note 12, at 993–94.
320. See Wiseman, supra note 6, at 458.
321. See supra Part II.C.1.
322. See supra Part II.C.2.
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question whether the failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence prior
to a guilty plea violates Brady.
III. AN ANALOGOUS CASE STUDY: EXTENSION OF THE RIGHT
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL TO PLEA BARGAINING

TO

In addressing the question of whether Brady applies to the disclosure of
exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining, a useful comparison may be
drawn to the right to effective assistance of counsel. The two rights are
doctrinally linked.323 While Brady concerns whether the prosecutor’s
actions violate a defendant’s due process rights,324 the right to effective
assistance of counsel provides a minimum standard of representation for the
defendant’s attorney.325 The Supreme Court has frequently noted that the
same standard of materiality applies to reviews of both claims.326
Additionally, like Brady, the right to effective assistance was traditionally
considered purely a trial right, as it was rooted in the Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial.327 While numerous courts have held that Brady should
not be extended to plea bargaining because it is a trial right,328 the Supreme
Court recently recognized the right to effective assistance of counsel as
applying during plea bargaining as well as trial. In two companion cases
decided in 2012, the Court held that a defendant may challenge a conviction
where his attorney’s deficient assistance caused him to reject a plea
agreement and receive a harsher sentence at trial.329 This part presents a
case study of how and why the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel—a right whose history and application share many similarities with
Brady rights—was expanded into the plea bargaining arena.
A. The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
The right to effective assistance of counsel is based in the Sixth
Amendment, which states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
323. See Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1183 n.109 (2012).
324. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
325. See Bibas, supra note 98, at 1143–44.
326. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
327. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309–10 (1973) (“This historical background
suggests that the core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure ‘Assistance’ at trial
. . . . Later developments have led this Court to recognize that ‘Assistance’ would be less
than meaningful if it were limited to the formal trial itself.”); see also Michael A.
Millemann, Collateral Remedies in Criminal Cases in Maryland: An Assessment, 64 MD. L.
REV. 968, 968–69 (2005) (“[T]he collateral process is usually the sole means by which a
convicted person can enforce fundamental fair-trial rights, for example, to the effective
assistance of counsel . . . .”); David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1238 (2002).
328. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 285 (4th Cir. 2010); Matthew v.
Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2000).
329. See generally Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399, 1407 (2012).
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defence.”330 While the Sixth Amendment provides only for the basic right
to counsel, the idea that representation has to be more than nominal did not
appear until 1932 in Powell v. Alabama.331 In Powell, the Supreme Court
held that even though the trial court had attempted to designate counsel to
the defendants, that attempt was either so half-hearted or so close to the
start of the trial that it “amount[ed] to a denial of effective and substantial
aid in that regard.”332 Powell thus set forth the idea that the right to counsel
requires some threshold level of effectiveness.333 However, the Court did
not define exactly what such representation actually entails.334
The Supreme Court set the standard for overturning a conviction based
on ineffective assistance of counsel over fifty years later in Strickland v.
Washington.335 The Court held that the right to counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel, and established a two-part test for
determining when that right is violated.336 First, the defendant must show
that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.337 Second, the defendant must show that his attorney’s
substandard assistance caused him prejudice.338 To demonstrate prejudice,
the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s
errors.339 As noted in Bagley, this test for prejudice was based on the “test
for materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by
the prosecution” in adjudicating Brady claims.340 Where representation is
deficient and prejudice is shown, the Court held that a conviction must be
overturned, as the attorney’s ineffective assistance “so undermined the
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
on as having produced a just result.”341
Although the holding was based primarily on the Sixth Amendment, the
language used by the Court was not limited to the trial context.
Washington’s challenge was not to his attorney’s actions at trial, but rather
at the sentencing proceeding.342 The Court stated that the role of counsel
was not only to promote a just trial, but to ensure the “ability of the
adversarial system to produce just results.”343 Ultimately, the question that
330. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
331. 287 U.S. 45 (1932); see also SALTZBURG, supra note 57, at 1301.
332. Powell, 287 U.S. at 53.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
336. See id. at 686–87.
337. See id. at 687.
338. See id.
339. See id. at 694. Note that the Court did not confine the test to whether the outcome of
the trial would have been different, but rather whether the outcome of the proceeding would
change.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 686.
342. See id. at 686–87.
343. Id. at 685 (emphasis added).
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the Strickland test sought to answer was whether “the conviction or . . .
sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders
the result unreliable.”344 This question left open the possibility that the
right to effective assistance of counsel could be expanded to other stages of
the judicial process.
The Supreme Court first considered the use of the two-part Strickland
test in the context of a guilty plea in Hill v. Lockhart, where defendant
William Hill argued that his attorney’s incorrect legal advice rendered his
guilty plea involuntary.345 The Supreme Court held that the Strickland test
applies to ineffective assistance of counsel challenges to guilty pleas.346
The Court’s holding was essentially a mixture of the tests set forth in
Boykin and Strickland.347 First, the Court cited Boykin for the proposition
that a guilty plea is only valid when it “represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant.”348 Where a defendant pleads guilty on the advice of counsel,
he must to show that the advice of his attorney was not “within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” in order to render his
plea involuntary.349
The Court held that this test for determining whether a plea was truly
voluntary was not only compatible with the two-part test set forth in
Strickland, but was supported by the same justifications.350 To ensure the
proper administration of justice and prevent innocent defendants from being
convicted, errors that affect the outcome of a judicial proceeding must have
a remedy.351 To invalidate a guilty plea on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must therefore show first that his
attorney’s advice fell below an objectively reasonable standard, and second,
that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty
absent the errors of his attorney.352 As Hill did not allege that he would
have pled not guilty having received different advice, the Court found that
he was not prejudiced by his attorney’s error.353
B. The Conflict: Whether or Not To Fully Extend the Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel to Plea Bargaining
Hill allowed a defendant to vacate a guilty plea where the ineffective
assistance of counsel led him to accept a plea bargain and forgo trial, but it
344. Id. at 687.
345. 474 U.S. 52, 53–56 (1985). Hill’s attorney told him that he would be eligible for
parole under the guilty plea agreement much earlier than was actually the case. Id. at 55.
346. Id. at 58.
347. See id. at 56–60.
348. Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).
349. Id. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
350. See id. at 57.
351. See id. at 57–58; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693–96 (1984);
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) .
352. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57–60.
353. Id. at 60.
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did not address what recourse, if any, was available to a defendant whose
attorney’s deficient performance caused him to reject a plea bargain and
proceed to trial.354 Courts generally took one of three different approaches
to this problem: no remedy, specific performance of the plea bargain, or
retrial.355
The courts that provided no remedy for a defendant whose attorney’s
deficient performance caused him to reject a plea agreement generally
found that such a defendant suffered no prejudice.356 These courts held that
prejudice occurs where some error deprives a defendant of some substantive
or procedural right, but as there is no constitutional right to plea bargain,357
there was no prejudice in rejecting a plea and standing trial.358 Courts
found that this holding was further supported by the fact that the right to
effective assistance of counsel was “grounded in the constitutional right to
receive a fair trial.”359 This reason for denying post-plea ineffective
assistance challenges to rejected guilty pleas mirrors the reason often put
forth for denying post-plea Brady challenges: both were considered by
some courts to be purely trial rights.360 Finally, courts declining to allow
ineffective assistance challenges where the defendant rejected a plea
agreement found that it would be extremely difficult to determine the
soundness of the attorney’s representation, whether the defendant actually
would have pled differently, and whether the court would have accepted the
plea.361
Where courts found that the decision to reject a plea agreement did cause
prejudice, that prejudice consisted of receiving a higher sentence at trial
than he would have received under the guilty plea agreement.362 One
remedy used by courts to cure this prejudice was the reinstatement of the
original plea offer.363 For example, in United States v. Blaylock, the Ninth
Circuit found prejudice where the defendant would have received a less
severe sentence had he gone to trial.364 The court held that in determining
the proper remedy, a court should “put the defendant back in the position he

354. See Bibas, supra note 98, at 1140.
355. David A. Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1535–36 (2011).
356. See, e.g., State v. Monroe, 757 So. 2d 895, 898 (La. Ct. App. 2000); State v.
Taccetta, 975 A.2d 928, 935–37 (N.J. 2009).
357. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977).
358. Perez, supra note 355, at 1540–41.
359. See, e.g., State v. Greuber, 165 P.3d 1185, 1188 (Utah 2007).
360. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
361. Perez, supra note 355, at 1542–43; see also, e.g., Rasmussen v. State, 658 S.W.2d
867, 868 (Ark. 1983) (finding no remedy because the defendant did not allege that she would
have accepted the plea but for her attorney’s ineffective assistance or that she would now
accept the plea agreement); In re Alvernaz, 830 P.2d 747, 756–57 (Cal. 1992) (discussing
the difficulty in determining whether a defendant would have accepted the plea bargain offer
had she received effective assistance of counsel).
362. See Perez, supra note 355, at 1553.
363. See United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994).
364. See id.
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would have been in if the Sixth Amendment violation had not occurred.”365
The court found that in many cases a new trial would not cure the harm, and
held that in such cases the original plea must be reoffered.366 However, not
all courts proceeded identically in reinstating the original plea. While some
directed the government to reoffer the plea agreement and allow the
defendant to decide whether or not to accept, others mandated that the
defendant accept the original plea agreement and directed the trial court to
sentence the defendant accordingly.367
The second remedy offered by courts finding prejudice is the granting of
a new trial.368 These courts also found prejudice where a defendant
received a harsher sentence at trial than he would have if he had accepted
the plea offer, and the decision to reject the offer was the result of deficient
assistance of counsel.369 However, these courts held that reoffering the
original plea agreement was not a proper remedy. In Julian v. Bartley, the
Seventh Circuit found that specific performance was inappropriate because
the state was not responsible for the Sixth Amendment violation, and the
defendant had never accepted the terms of the original offer.370 Instead, the
judge ordered a new trial, and the court acknowledged that the state could
choose to propose a plea agreement if it wished.371
From these three approaches to cases where the ineffective assistance of
counsel leads to the rejection of a plea agreement, two crucial questions
remained: First, does receiving a harsher sentence after a fair trial
constitute prejudice to the defendant? Second, if so, what is the proper
remedy? The Supreme Court answered these questions in Lafler v.
Cooper372 and Missouri v. Frye.373
C. Resolution: Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye
This section outlines and discusses two companion Supreme Court cases
decided in 2012 that fully extended the right to effective assistance of
counsel to defendants during plea bargaining.
1. Lafler v. Cooper
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Lafler and Fry address the other
side of the Hill coin: situations where defense counsel’s errors caused a
365. Id.
366. Id. (finding such a remedy permissible under Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 510
n.11 (1984), and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971)).
367. Perez, supra note 355, at 1548.
368. Tara Harrison, Note, The Pendulum of Justice: Analyzing the Indigent Defendant’s
Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel When Pleading Not Guilty at the Plea
Bargaining Stage, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 1185, 1202.
369. See, e.g., Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 500 (7th Cir. 2007); Turner v. Tennessee,
858 F.2d 1201, 1207 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902 (1989).
370. See Julian, 495 F.3d at 500.
371. Id.
372. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
373. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
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defendant not to enter a guilty plea.374 In these two 5–4 decisions decided
on the same day, the Court solidified the right to effective assistance of
counsel during plea bargaining.375
In Lafler, the question taken up by the Supreme Court was whether
Cooper’s attorney’s incorrect legal statements regarding the prosecution’s
ability to prove its case during plea bargaining, which led him to reject a
favorable plea agreement and proceed to trial, deprived him of effective
assistance of counsel.376 Although the petitioner and the Solicitor General
argued that the Sixth Amendment protects only the defendant’s right to a
fair trial, the Court disagreed.377 Rather, the defendant was entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel at all “critical stages of a criminal
proceeding.”378 The Court had already held in previous cases that plea
negotiation was a critical stage.379 The guarantee of this constitutional right
at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding is necessary to ensure the fair
administration of the judicial process because defendants “cannot be
presumed to make critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”380
The Court, citing Hill, applied the Strickland test to Cooper’s claim.381
This test is properly applied to plea bargaining because the question at the
heart of the Strickland inquiry is whether the attorney’s errors “so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that it failed to
produce a reliably just result.”382 Thus the concern was with justice and
fairness not solely at trial, but throughout the entire judicial process,
including the plea bargaining stage that preceded it.383 The Court found
that an otherwise fair trial does not remedy errors that occur during plea
bargaining.384 Both sides agreed that the advice of Cooper’s counsel was
deficient under the first Strickland prong; the problem was how to
determine prejudice under the second prong.385
The Court held that to show prejudice, Cooper had to show that the
outcome of the plea process would have been different had he received
sound legal advice.386 In Hill, that meant only that the defendant had to

374. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383–84; Frye, 123 S. Ct. at 1408.
375. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383–84; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
376. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383–84. Cooper was charged with numerous felonies and
misdemeanors after repeatedly shooting a woman. Id. at 1383. The prosecution made two
offers to dismiss some of the charges and to recommend a lower sentence if he pleaded
guilty. Id. Cooper refused both offers and was subsequently convicted on all counts and
sentenced to a mandatory minimum of 185 to 360 months imprisonment. Id.
377. See id. at 1385.
378. Id.
379. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 57 (1985)).
380. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385.
381. Id. at 1384–85; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
382. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1393 (citations omitted).
383. Id. at 1388.
384. Id. at 1386.
385. See id. at 1385.
386. Id.
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show that he would not have pled guilty without the error of his attorney.387
In this case, however, the Court held that Cooper must show three things:
first, a reasonable probability that, but for the advice of his counsel, he
would have entered a guilty plea; second, that the court would have
accepted his terms; and third, that the conviction or sentence imposed
would have been more favorable than what was actually decided.388 The
Court held that Cooper was prejudiced by his attorney’s advice not to
accept the plea offer, as he received a sentence more than three times as
harsh as he would have had he pled guilty, and the case was remanded with
an order that the state reoffer the plea agreement.389
In further support of its holding that the Strickland test applied to the
rejection of a guilty plea agreement, the Court noted that even though a
defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain, a defendant still
retains his constitutional rights when the prosecution decides to engage in
such negotiations: “When [the government] opts to act in a field where its
action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in
accord with the dictates of the Constitution.”390 The effective assistance of
counsel is a constitutional right afforded to criminal defendants, and when a
prosecutor decides to bring a defendant to the plea bargaining table—a
critical stage of the judicial process—the defendant’s constitutional rights
come with him.391
Justice Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, and Chief
Justice Roberts in all but part IV.392 Justice Scalia lamented what he
viewed as the newly “constitutionalized” plea bargaining process, fearing
that the Court would soon attempt to govern not only the behavior of
defense attorneys but also the prosecution during plea bargaining.393 He
found it problematic that Cooper’s alleged injury was having to stand
trial.394
Justice Scalia took no issue with the characterization of the entry of a
guilty plea as a “critical stage” of the judicial process during which a
defendant must be afforded the right to effective assistance of counsel.395
However, he limited that characterization to the acceptance of a guilty plea;
he would not require the effective assistance of counsel before a defendant
rejects a plea bargain and proceeds to trial.396 Perhaps more importantly,
Justice Scalia viewed the right to effective assistance of counsel as existing
only to ensure a fair trial.397 Thus, there can be no Sixth Amendment
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.

See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385.
Id. at 1391.
Id. at 1387 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
Id. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1391–92.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1393.
See id.
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violation where the prejudice complained of is having to stand trial, even
where the sentence is higher than would have been imposed under the plea
agreement.398 According to Justice Scalia, Cooper was not deprived of a
fair process by being forced to stand trial.399
2. Missouri v. Frye
The Court addressed a similar, but not identical, question in Frye.400
Whereas Lafler involved a defendant’s rejection of a favorable plea offer on
the advice of counsel, Frye involved the defendant’s attorney’s failure to
inform him of a plea offer, and the defendant’s acceptance of a subsequent
offer on less favorable terms.401 The Supreme Court held that defense
counsel has a duty to inform the defendant of potentially favorable plea
offers made by the prosecution.402 By failing to do so in this case, Frye’s
attorney deprived him of his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel.403 The Court began its decision with a discussion of Hill and
Padilla v. Kentucky.404 First, the Court reiterated the proposition from Hill
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims for errors during plea
bargaining are governed by the Strickland test.405 Second, the Court noted
that plea bargaining is a “critical phase” of the judicial process, and that the
constitutional protections of the Sixth Amendment apply even in that
pretrial context.406 Moreover, the Court stated that a “knowing and
voluntary” guilty plea does not supersede mistakes by a defendant’s
attorney.407
While the Court acknowledged the state’s argument that this presented a
different situation from Hill and Padilla because those cases concerned a
defendant who had accepted a guilty plea agreement, the Court did not find
that difference sufficient to overcome the need for constitutional protection
during plea bargaining.408 As in Lafler, the Court found that a defendant is
entitled to effective assistance of counsel at all “critical stages” of a
criminal proceeding.409 The Court understood “critical stages” to include
the entry of a guilty plea.410
The State urged that a defendant should not be allowed to vacate a guilty
plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel for a number of reasons.411
398. See id. at 1393–94.
399. Id. at 1395.
400. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
401. Id. at 1404.
402. Id. at 1408.
403. See id.
404. See id. at 1405; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010); Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
405. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405–06.
406. Id. at 1406 (quoting Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486).
407. Id.
408. See id. at 1406–08.
409. See id. at 1405 (internal quotation marks omitted).
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1407.
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Most importantly, the State argued that there is no constitutionally
guaranteed right to accept a guilty plea offer, and that the plea bargaining
process is so amorphous and lacking in clear standards or timelines that the
prosecution would have little notice of problems or capacity to intervene.412
While the Court found that these were tenable arguments, they were
outweighed by the “simple reality” that 97 percent of federal convictions
were obtained through guilty pleas.413 Due to the importance of plea
bargaining to the judicial process, the Court reasoned that defense counsel
had responsibilities that must be met in order to ensure the fair
administration of justice.414 Moreover, the Court found that because the
criminal justice system is now “for the most part a system of pleas, not a
system of trials,” the guarantee of a fair trial was insufficient to cure pretrial
errors.415 To deny defendants the effective assistance of counsel at plea
bargaining would be to deny them effective representation “at the only
stage when legal aid and advice would help him.”416 To provide the
effective assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, the Court held
that defense counsel had a duty to communicate formal guilty plea offers to
the defendant.417 Frye’s attorney’s failure to do so therefore rendered his
performance deficient.418
As in Lafler, the Supreme Court applied the same standard of materiality
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims as is used to review Brady
claims: the defendant must show a “reasonable probability [that he] would
have accepted the earlier plea offer had [he] been afforded effective
assistance of counsel.”419 In this case, Frye had to prove a reasonable
probability that the end result of his criminal proceedings would have been
more favorable, whether by a plea to a lesser charge against him or a less
harsh sentence.420 As Frye’s attorney failed to communicate the plea offer,
the Supreme Court remanded the case to apply the appropriate Strickland
test and to determine if Frye was prejudiced by that failure.421
Justice Scalia once again dissented, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito.422 Although Justice Scalia found the cases to be
substantially similar, he found that the justifications for his dissent in Lafler
were even more present in Frye, where the fairness of the process and the
conviction were established by the defendant’s admission of guilt.423

412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id.
See id.; see also Bibas, supra note 4, at 154.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
Id.
Id. at 1408 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1409.
See id.
Id. at 1410–11.
Id. at 1412.
See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).

3640

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Justice Scalia found that, as there is no constitutional right to plea
bargain, Frye was not deprived of any substantive or procedural right by his
attorney’s failure to inform him of the plea offer.424 There was no question
that this failure rendered the attorney’s performance deficient; however, as
the deficiency did not deprive Frye of his “constitutional right to a fair
trial,” there was no prejudice and no need for remedy.425 The dissent also
took issue with the difficulty of defining what constitutes adequate
representation during plea bargaining, finding it disconcerting that an
attorney’s “personal style” might violate the Sixth Amendment.426
Finally, the dissent disagreed with the Court’s analysis of potential
prejudice to the defendant.427 Justice Scalia found it absurd to engage in
“retrospective crystal-ball gazing” to determine whether the defendant
would have accepted the earlier plea bargain, whether the prosecution
would have withdrawn it, and whether the court would have accepted it.428
He admitted that plea bargaining should be regulated, but found that the
Sixth Amendment was not the proper means to do so.429
3. The Response to Lafler and Frye
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Lafler and Frye were viewed by
commentators as both logical and inevitable, the objections of Justice Scalia
and the other dissenters notwithstanding.430 While the dissent took a
formalist, historical approach to the question, the majority’s approach was
more functional and contemporary, focusing on the fact that plea bargaining
now dominates the criminal justice system.431 Having acknowledged the
importance of plea bargaining as a critical stage in the judicial process, the
Court would have been hard-pressed to deny constitutional protections to
defendants at that stage. The right to effective assistance of counsel could
not be confined to the trial context; to hold otherwise would be to grant that
right to only the 3 percent of federal defendants that actually go to trial.432
Another important ruling from Lafler and Frye is that an otherwise fair trial
does not cure the constitutional errors that came before.433 Indeed,

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.

See id.
See id.; see also Bibas, supra note 4, at 157–58.
See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412–13 (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. at 1413.
Id.
See id. at 1413–14.
See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 39 (2012), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part/
supreme-court/frye-and-lafler:-no-big-deal/; see also Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye and Our
Still-Unregulated Plea Bargaining System, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 131 (2012).
431. Bibas, supra note 4, at 151.
432. Lynch, supra note 430, at 40.
433. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer
Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 204
(2012).
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prejudice may be found where a heavier sentence is imposed than would
have occurred had the defendant accepted the earlier plea.434
Finally, while Justice Scalia found that the Court’s decisions constituted
a radical departure from established jurisprudence,435 others viewed the
decisions as simply applying the standards already established in
Strickland.436 Strickland had a goal of promoting a just result, and this goal
applies equally to convictions and sentences, even for guilty defendants.437
In this sense, Lafler and Frye were relatively straightforward cases: both
defendants were prejudiced by receiving longer sentences due to
unquestionably deficient assistance of counsel during plea bargaining,
which is a critical stage of the judicial process.438 Under the Strickland
standard, the Sixth Amendment required that their sentences be vacated and
remanded.439
IV. RECOGNIZING THE RIGHT: THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD PERMIT
EXCULPATORY BRADY CHALLENGES TO GUILTY PLEAS
The Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split that currently exists
by allowing a criminal defendant to challenge a guilty plea for the failure to
disclose exculpatory Brady material. To settle this conflict, the Court
should look not only to the prevailing logic among the circuit courts and its
previous holding in Ruiz but also to its own recent decisions in Lafler and
Frye that considered a question with very similar constitutional
underpinnings in the context of plea bargaining. Part IV.A of this Note
shows that Ruiz allows exculpatory Brady challenges to guilty pleas. Part
IV.B argues that courts considering these challenges should follow the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that a pre-plea Brady violation automatically
precludes a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Part IV.C concludes by
asserting that the same practical and jurisprudential reasoning that justified
recognizing the pre-plea right to effective assistance of counsel also applies
to Brady violations.
A. Ruiz Suggests That Material Exculpatory Evidence Must
Be Disclosed Prior to a Guilty Plea
Despite the Supreme Court’s focus on impeachment evidence in Ruiz, the
holding suggests that a defendant may raise a post-plea Brady challenge for
the failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence.440 First, contrary to
the Second Circuit’s understanding in Friedman, the holding in Ruiz did not
434. Bibas, supra note 4, at 155. This was the case in Lafler, where his sentence after
trial was over three times longer than what was offered during plea bargaining. See Lafler v.
Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012).
435. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398.
436. See Bibas, supra note 4, at 160.
437. See id.
438. See Lynch, supra note 430, at 39–40.
439. Bibas, supra note 4, at 151.
440. See supra Part II.B.
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apply equally to impeachment and exculpatory evidence.441 The Second
Circuit properly found that, prior to Ruiz, the Supreme Court treated
exculpatory and impeachment identically for purposes of Brady
disclosure.442 However, the conclusion it drew from that fact was
erroneous: if the Court had wished to proscribe all post-plea Brady
challenges, it could have easily done so by issuing its holding in general
Brady terms. Instead, the language used throughout the opinion, and
specifically in the holding, was explicitly in terms of impeachment
evidence: “These considerations, taken together, lead us to conclude that
the Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material
impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal
defendant.”443 Thus, at the very least it can be said that Ruiz declined to
address post–guilty plea exculpatory Brady challenges; but it does not
follow from the language of the opinion that Ruiz precludes all post-plea
Brady claims.
Rather than being neutral, the Supreme Court’s holding in Ruiz actually
suggests that exculpatory Brady challenges are permitted for the very
reasons that impeachment challenges are not.444 First, while courts
proscribing Brady challenges to guilty pleas typically repeated the refrain
that Brady was purely a “trial right,”445 the Supreme Court declined to do
so. Furthermore, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits were correct in
understanding the Supreme Court in Ruiz to draw a significant distinction
between impeachment and exculpatory evidence: whereas impeachment
evidence is only important in relation to the fairness of the trial, and
therefore does not have to be disclosed before a guilty plea, exculpatory
evidence may be determinative of the constitutional validity of a guilty
plea.446 The Supreme Court found that impeachment evidence is unlikely
to be “critical information of which the defendant must always be aware
prior to pleading guilty.”447 What, then, would constitute such “critical
information”? As noted by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, the answer
implied by the Supreme Court is exculpatory evidence: a defendant’s
waiver of his constitutional rights through a guilty plea cannot be truly
knowing and voluntary if he is unaware of evidence possessed by the
prosecution that establishes his factual innocence.448
Additional justification for understanding Ruiz as allowing exculpatory
Brady challenges to guilty pleas is found in the Supreme Court’s discussion
of the “fast track” plea agreement’s stipulations. One of the key reasons
behind the Court’s holding that the “fast track” agreement did not violate
due process was the fact that the agreement explicitly required the
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government to disclose material exculpatory evidence.449 The Court found
that this disclosure of exculpatory evidence ensured that innocent
defendants would not plead guilty, and held that the suppression of
impeachment evidence does not violate due process so long as exculpatory
evidence is divulged.450 By emphasizing the value of the exculpatory
evidence disclosure requirement, the Supreme Court further underscored
the distinction between impeachment and exculpatory evidence and
indicated that the failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence violates
a defendant’s due process rights.451
B. The Failure To Disclose Material Exculpatory Evidence Precludes
a Knowing and Voluntary Guilty Plea
Accepting that Ruiz allows Brady challenges for the failure to disclose
material exculpatory evidence prior to a guilty plea, the question then
becomes how to determine whether that failure renders a plea invalid.
From the circuits that have allowed post–guilty plea Brady challenges, four
methods of inquiry have emerged: (1) the Second Circuit’s official
misconduct approach, in which a Brady violation may invalidate an
otherwise knowing and voluntary plea;452 (2) the Tenth Circuit’s
misrepresentation approach, under which a Brady violation constitutes
government misconduct that may preclude a knowing and voluntary guilty
plea;453 (3) the Sixth and Eighth Circuits’ totality-of-the-circumstances
approach, whereby a Brady violation is one of many factors that may negate
the knowing and voluntary nature of a guilty plea;454 and (4) the Ninth
Circuit’s per se approach, finding that a Brady violation automatically
renders a guilty plea unknowing and involuntary.455 Of these four, the
Ninth Circuit’s approach provides the most workable standard, and is the
most closely aligned with the Supreme Court’s guilty plea jurisprudence.
The Second Circuit’s misconduct approach misses the mark by choosing
not to consider a Brady violation in relation to the knowing and voluntary
nature of the plea.456 The court laudably noted that a defendant’s decision
to plead guilty is highly dependent on his determination of the strength of
the prosecution’s case and the existence of exculpatory information.457
However, by phrasing its test in terms of government misconduct, the
Second Circuit leaves open the question of what exactly constitutes official
misconduct. It is unclear whether misconduct occurs only when a
prosecutor suppresses information specifically requested, or also where a
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prosecutor fails to divulge evidence in the absence of a specific request.458
Disclosure is required in both situations under Agurs.459 Additionally, this
test fails to address the central question of a guilty plea’s validity—its
knowing and voluntary nature.460 While the later Brady—Brady v. United
States—did mention misconduct as a concern for the validity of guilty
pleas,461 subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence has been almost
exclusively concerned with the knowing and voluntary standard.462
The Tenth Circuit’s approach is similar to the Second Circuit’s in that it
views Brady violations as official misconduct or misrepresentation.463
However, this standard fits better with established guilty plea jurisprudence
because it asks whether that official misconduct precludes a knowing and
voluntary plea.464 Still, this approach falls short of a proper standard
because it finds that a Brady violation renders a guilty plea unknowing and
involuntary only under certain circumstances.465 A Brady violation is a
violation of due process, and the Tenth Circuit recognized that Brady
violations may occur during plea bargaining; it stands to reason that no plea
which was entered through a violation of the defendant’s due process rights
should retain its validity.466
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach adopted by the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits is attractive because it engenders careful consideration of
whether a guilty plea was truly knowing and voluntary.467 Additionally,
this approach would survive an interpretation of Ruiz that precludes all
post-plea Brady challenges, because even if the suppression of material
exculpatory evidence is not couched in terms of Brady, it is still one of the
circumstances taken into account in determining the validity of the plea.468
However, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach affords too little
protection to defendants, as a Brady violation may still be insufficient to
render a plea unknowing and involuntary.469 Like the Tenth Circuit’s
approach, this approach does not comport with the Brady materiality
standard. Due process is violated where there is a reasonable probability
that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence
been disclosed;470 under the totality-of-the-circumstances test, a court could
find that a Brady violation occurred but still find that the guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary because of additional factors surrounding the entry
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of the plea.471 This gray area makes the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach somewhat unworkable, and gives courts insufficient guidance on
how to determine whether a plea was actually valid.
The Ninth Circuit’s per se approach is the best application of the Brady
rule to plea bargaining.472 Under this structure, if the court finds that the
prosecution fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence prior to the entry
of a guilty plea, the plea is automatically rendered unknowing and
involuntary.473 The standard of materiality is imported from Bagley: a
Brady violation renders a plea invalid if there is a reasonable probability
that the result of the plea negotiations would have been more favorable had
the defendant received the undisclosed evidence.474 Unlike the Second
Circuit’s approach, this standard addresses the central question of
constitutionality for a guilty plea: whether it was truly knowing and
voluntary.475 Moreover, there is no gray area where Brady is violated but
the plea is still considered knowing and voluntary. Due process is violated
where material exculpatory evidence is withheld, and any plea entered
without knowledge of that evidence is not truly knowing and voluntary.476
The Ninth Circuit’s approach is not without its problems. The Supreme
Court has held that a valid guilty plea does not require that a defendant have
a perfect assessment of the strength of the prosecution’s case.477 However,
the per se approach does not seek to provide a defendant with a complete
understanding of the case against him. Rather, it requires only that the
prosecution turn over any exculpatory evidence that is material to the
decision to plead guilty.478 The government therefore does not have to
disclose immaterial evidence or impeachment evidence, so there is no fear
that the prosecution will have to turn over its “entire file” to the
defendant.479
Moreover, while some additional judicial resources may be expended by
defendants choosing to go to trial after learning of exculpatory evidence
rather than pleading guilty,480 this expenditure is justified by both the
criminal justice system’s interest in providing a fair and nonduplicitous plea
bargaining system and the benefits this rule would confer upon
defendants.481 Moreover, it would not require the government to expend
resources digging for exculpatory evidence; it would only require the
disclosure of evidence it already possessed. Given the extremely high
471. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text.
472. See supra Part II.A.5.
473. See supra notes 200–01 and accompanying text.
474. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
476. See supra notes 200–01, 206 and accompanying text.
477. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
478. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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percentage of cases ending in guilty pleas482 and the importance of
exculpatory evidence in the decision to plead guilty,483 disclosure of
material exculpatory evidence is necessary to ensure fair and just plea
bargaining.
As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, the per se approach is justified by
substantial policy considerations.484 First, the defendant’s appraisal of the
prosecution’s case is crucial to an informed decision on how to plead.485
When discussing the knowing and voluntary requirement for a valid guilty
plea, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the defendant must
have “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences” of his guilty plea.486 This does not mean that the defendant
must be aware of every piece of evidence, or every argument the
prosecution intends to make; but it cannot be said that a defendant has
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances if he pleads guilty to a
crime without knowing that the prosecution possesses evidence establishing
his factual innocence.
Second, a rule to the contrary would incentivize prosecutors to withhold
material exculpatory evidence in order to compel a defendant to plead
guilty.487 Prosecutors are incentivized to obtain convictions,488 and as a
prosecutor knows that her chances of securing a conviction will decrease at
trial because she will have to disclose exculpatory evidence, she will be
motivated to conceal that evidence in order to obtain a conviction through
plea bargaining.489
Third, it is naïve for courts and commentators to assume that innocent
defendants will not plead guilty.490 Overcharging and mandatory minimum
sentencing create an overwhelming pressure on defendants to plead
guilty.491 In addition to the risk of harsher punishment, there are other costs
incurred by a defendant who goes to trial, including attorney’s fees, time,
stress and emotional harm, and the ignominy of having to publicly stand
trial.492 The pressure to plead guilty is strong for both minor and major
offenses. For a minor offense, pleading guilty may be a way to avoid jail
time; for a major crime, it might allow a defendant to avoid the death
penalty. While Rule 11 and jurisprudential safeguards theoretically prevent
innocent defendants from pleading guilty,493 the reality is that a guilty plea
is a rational choice for many innocent defendants.
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When considering Brady challenges to guilty pleas, a court should
therefore proceed as follows. First, the court must determine whether the
undisclosed evidence can be considered exculpatory.494 Second, the court
must determine if the evidence is material by asking if there is a reasonable
probability that the result of plea bargaining would have been different had
the evidence been disclosed.495 If such a probability exists, the guilty plea
is not knowing and voluntary, and is therefore invalid.
C. The Logic of Lafler and Frye Supports the Recognition of
Exculpatory Brady Rights During Plea Bargaining
Courts and commentators have frequently noted the link between the
right to effective assistance of counsel and Brady rights.496 They are two
sides of the same coin—concerning whether the actions of defense counsel
or the prosecution during the judicial process violate the defendant’s
constitutional rights.497 In addition, violations of both rights are asserted by
defendants to challenge their convictions;498 they share the same standard
of materiality, asking whether there is a reasonable probability that the
result of the proceeding would have been different absent the deficient
representation or suppression of evidence;499 and both were traditionally
considered to be purely trial rights.500 Given the link between these two
rights, it is unsurprising that much of the logic that supported the extension
of the right to ineffective assistance of counsel to plea bargaining also
applies to the question of pre-plea Brady disclosure.
First, Lafler and Frye suggest that the assertion that Brady is a “trial
right” will not preclude it from being applied during plea bargaining.
Effective assistance of counsel was traditionally considered a right that
ensured only a fair trial,501 but in Lafler and Frye the Supreme Court
expressly rejected that argument.502 Instead, the Court found that
guaranteeing the right to effective assistance of counsel at all “critical
stages of the criminal proceeding” was necessary for the fair administration
of justice.503 The chief concern of the Supreme Court in both Lafler and
Bagley was ensuring a fair judicial process that results in just outcomes, not
solely ensuring fair trials.504 This concern necessitates pre-plea disclosure
of exculpatory Brady evidence, because just as a defendant “cannot be
presumed to make critical decisions without counsel’s advice,”505 neither
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can he be presumed to make an informed decision to plead guilty without
material exculpatory evidence.506 As the Court has recognized that plea
bargaining is a critical stage of the judicial process,507 and as it has
suggested that exculpatory evidence is crucial to decision making at that
stage,508 it is evident after Lafler and Frye that Brady’s traditional existence
as a trial right will not preclude the recognition of exculpatory Brady rights
during plea bargaining.
Second, the Court’s recognition of the prevalence of plea bargaining—
roughly 97 percent of federal criminal convictions—supports the
establishment of pre-plea exculpatory Brady rights.509 The Court in Frye
acknowledged the State’s arguments that there is no constitutional right to
plea bargaining, and that the right to effective assistance of counsel would
be difficult to apply during plea bargaining.510 However, the Court found
that these arguments were outweighed by the importance of plea bargaining
to the criminal process: the right to effective assistance of counsel is
guaranteed by the Constitution, and it cannot be ignored during plea
bargaining, which now represents virtually the entire criminal justice
system.511 So too with Brady: as the vast majority of criminal proceedings
are resolved by guilty pleas, denying defendants’ Brady rights during plea
bargaining would be to deny those rights at the only stage when they could
actually be of use.512 The importance of plea bargaining therefore
outweighs concerns of judicial efficiency and resource expenditure that
accompany a pre-plea exculpatory disclosure requirement.513 Like the right
to effective assistance of counsel, exculpatory Brady rights are guaranteed
by the Constitution, and should not be afforded only to the tiny fraction of
defendants who proceed to trial.
Third, Lafler and Frye shoot down the argument that exculpatory Brady
rights should not be afforded during plea bargaining because there is no
constitutional right to plea bargain.514 The Supreme Court held in no
uncertain terms that, while the prosecution is not constitutionally required
to engage in plea bargaining, it is required to abide by the Constitution’s
protections for defendants if it chooses to do so.515 If prosecutors do not
wish to turn over exculpatory evidence, expend resources on pre-plea
discovery, or risk giving away too much of their case, then they can abstain
from plea bargaining. But as the Court found in Lafler, once the
government begins to enter into highly discretionary negotiations that will
ultimately affect the defendant’s freedom, it is bound to respect the
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defendant’s constitutional right to the disclosure of material exculpatory
evidence.516
Fourth, the standard of materiality that is used to review both Brady and
ineffective assistance of counsel claims suggests that defendants should be
able to assert post-plea exculpatory Brady claims. In Lafler and Frye, the
Supreme Court continued to apply the standard from Bagley, holding that a
conviction must be vacated if there is a reasonable probability that, but for
his attorney’s errors, the result of the proceeding—in this case, plea
bargaining—would have been more favorable to the defendant.517 From
this standard, it is evident that a guilty plea does not waive claims of
constitutional deficiencies that materially affect a defendant’s decision
whether to plead guilty. Like deficient advice from an attorney, the
suppression of material exculpatory evidence during plea bargaining
impedes a defendant’s rational decision making and precludes a knowing
and voluntary plea.518 Therefore, just as a guilty plea or a conviction must
be vacated where the ineffective assistance of counsel materially affects the
defendant’s decision to plead guilty, the same should be true where the
prosecution’s suppression of exculpatory evidence materially affects that
decision.
Finally, Justice Scalia’s criticism that having to stand trial cannot
constitute prejudice will not apply to post-plea Brady claims, because the
suppression of material exculpatory evidence will rarely, if ever, lead to the
rejection of a plea offer.519 When a defendant is deprived of exculpatory
evidence, he views the government’s case as being stronger than it actually
is, and is therefore compelled to accept a seemingly favorable plea offer to
avoid trial.520 It is difficult to envision a situation in which the suppression
of evidence establishing a defendant’s factual innocence would lead him to
prefer trial over a plea to a lesser charge or sentence. Pre-plea exculpatory
Brady violations impel defendants to plead guilty, thereby depriving them
of the “gold standard of American justice”: a full criminal trial.521 Such
violations cause substantial prejudice, especially when they lead innocent
defendants to plead guilty; but this prejudice can be avoided by requiring
the pre-plea disclosure of material exculpatory evidence. Thus, while
Justice Scalia bemoaned the “constitutionalization” of plea bargaining,522
allowing exculpatory Brady challenges to guilty pleas is necessary to
protect the constitutional rights of defendants and preserve the legitimacy of
today’s plea-based criminal justice system.
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CONCLUSION
Given the importance of the rights at stake, the Supreme Court should
address the viability of post-guilty plea exculpatory Brady claims. Almost
all criminal convictions are the result of guilty pleas, and yet while some
defendants are provided with evidence establishing their factual innocence
before they enter a plea, others must plea bargain without the benefit of that
evidence. The Supreme Court recently made substantial progress in
protecting defendants’ constitutional rights by recognizing the right to
effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining. In the interests of
fairness, accurate convictions, and a just criminal process, the Supreme
Court should continue that trend by requiring the disclosure of exculpatory
Brady evidence during plea bargaining and holding that the failure to do so
renders a guilty plea invalid.

